Germany and the Sino-Japanese conflict, 1937-1942 by Dolman, Arthur
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1961 
Germany and the Sino-Japanese conflict, 1937-1942 
Arthur Dolman 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Dolman, Arthur, "Germany and the Sino-Japanese conflict, 1937-1942" (1961). Graduate Student Theses, 
Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 2449. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/2449 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 




B,A, Mbat#a* at&t# U&*v*r#ity, I960
Ff#»#at#d lA p a r tia l felflllm & at of tb# requirement# fo r degree of
*&#ter of Aft*
MONTANA 3TATE %NIV2&&ITY 
1961
A p p r o v e d  b y *




INFORMATION TO ALL USERS  
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,




Published by ProQuest LLC (2012). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 -1 3 4 6
( y  c o # f fE x r f ;
P#@ e
P r« f#c$  i l l
C hap ter 1 BUk*#0«MmA
Cb#pt#r 11 # 7b# 6#f»w$ *lll%&ry Wl##**n
in  Chin» # , . . 4 4 .  , * . 4 ,  $ 4 .  4 2 lt
CW ^$r 111 * &*fm»n W»r 7r»d# with
C hin» , * 4 4 4 4 , 4 . . 4 . b9
Ch#pt#r iV # Dl##gr##*#Rt
f» r tR # f» » * » . * * # * . * *  4 4  ♦ * 4 * * f I
Ch»pt#f V * **Th% Chin# . . . 4 4 .  8 9
Chmptar VI C»R«l»»l<m . . . . . .  # 4 .  * 100
BlbliD pfm phy. 4 4 . 4 . 4 * 4 4 4 . . . # ,  106
j^ppeMix 1* 4 * .  4 . 4 . * # # * . .  4 . 112
^pexW lx  I I .  4 4 .  4 * 4 4 4 4 * 4 .  . 4 , llli.
A pptad lx  111, . # . . # * , . . 4 , 4 * . .  116
appendix IV . . . . .  4  ..............................   117
11
PREFACE
A# Wr, F* F* LIm World W*r 1 *nd World
*#r I I  Oermmay## iaflooneo la  Chlom %m$ la f&ct* #o
gr$#t th#t #*ch of Chlo»## oqmlpmoat #%# Ùorma mmdoi mmny 
of Chlom*# offioer#  (&#r*#A trofood; ood (Aloo#» whol* 
m llltory  orgoalootloA oad dovolopmoat #o# Ôorwm looplrod.
fh# l#od*f$ In @or#mny**tho Ro#oh*o«W# th# EcM%*ofeo 
M lalotry ond tho Porolga Off lo##*o#w tlm t Chia# ooàld help 
Qormmny la  too #my$* ## $ $oardo of row mmtorlml# mad m#
m potoAtlml pooof mgmloot BOlmbmvl#*» Mltlor thomght 
d lffo fon tly ; ho wmatod to  ooelrel# Rm*$lm, mad $mo la Jmpma 
tho boot fore# la  tho For Emot to  mceomplloh th lo  gool.
Tho $lao#AopoAo#o omr broke oat mad proved to  be m 
otmmblimg blook la  the %wy of Hitler** mmbltio&o for world 
power# Boon mfter the coafllo t begmn la  1437, MltBt^rwm* 
perommded by 3&pma to  withdrm# hi# aermmn rnllltmry mdvleer# 
from Qilom mad to  bremk off trmd# relmtlon# Im exchmmge for 
promlee# of m b e tte r eeeAomle po#ltl<m In m Jmpmneee#dominmted 
Chine, Bet once Oermmny hod compiled with the Jmpmneee 
demmAd#, the Jmpmneee mttitmde cooled. Oermmn becking of 
3epen did not eecomplieh Germeny** elm*.
i l l
the pertod between X91&0 »nd 19^1 the $lAo- 
J#pmn#*e c o n f lic t  ceeeed an add ition# ! problem fo r  8#rm»my: 
J*p#m womld met d r comld mot a tta c k  G reat B r ita in  in  the 
Far Eaat a# Ger#*ny advocated anleaa th e  war w ith China waa 
atapped.
The Chineae aa rah a l, Chfano Kai#ahek, repeated ly  refaaed 
Japameae attempt# to  make peace* The Marahal wanted the  
.iapaneae fan:## oat of China* The ianp^delayed death blew 
to  Bin*#Oerman re la tio n *  f in a l ly  cam# in  Ja ly  1, 19hl, when 
H i t le r  recogniaed the  regime of Wang Ghing*wei.
the Tf##ty #f V*r##m** th# e$f##a# $gmin
b#g«m# tAt*y$#t#d th# f$ f %»$% fr#m ebtch th#y ce#ld dr** 
r** a*#d$d by tk*ir Befor# *«rld Wmr I
tb# Oermma* h*d * #pb$r* of W l**#e# W * y#rt *f th* 
Bkmmtime Previae#.
B#e***# *#ci^f*d tb# Bhmatxmo p#a&a*#l* la  191^
*md *** $ tlU  1* th a t yrmrlme# la  1919# th# Cbla*#* §»*#ra*  ̂
Ê**at r*f**#d t# #l$a th# Treaty *T V*r#*lll$# #v*a th**$h It 
bad $at*r#d th# war am th# aid# ^  th# h ill# * . Alth###h 
Oarmaay had #l$^#d th la  treaty# tachalaa lly  a a ta t#  of war 
# t l l l  aalmtad h#t*##a Chlaa aad ##ra#ay*
$a 1921 a aayarat# ya*## traaty# farther #apyl#m#at#d 
la 19%̂ » allmlaatad th# awkward altaatlaa h#t*##a Chlma aad 
Qarmwy#  ̂ Th*## a#r#$a#at# y#rtalm#d t# th# yrlwat# yreyarty 
$#l##d darlag War Id War 1 hy th# Chi##*# G#*#ram*#t. Th# 
prayarty *a# ratarmad t# it# farmer Oaraa# #*##r# with th# 
aaeaptlaa #f ##m# prlrat# claim# agalaat th# Chlmaa# gavar#* 
m##t which war# #^aat hy flmaacial claim# of China #@al##t
^Kart Blach# @$rma# Imtanwt# ##d Pallci## %# _
Eaat (haw Tarki 10;W at#" ̂ ' waëWic ha)^atl'#ë#7'%9)T'%T
It w#$ »%*o that W Chin#
*er$ t# Chin*»#
i*  th# ##*y 0#rm#a citf»#m» t##k »p r##id#ae# in
Chin»# &më by W$# »» K*rt Bi#eh #$ti»»t#d* them w#p* »b#%t 
h# 0̂O @#p#»A» In th»t €@#ntpy, F#r#i#n firm## p#rt!##imriy 
A*#rio#n# eftem hired *»ti#m#ii» t# *#pk in Chia»,
Q#rm»m$ *#r# oi»d t#  ####p# th# R#p#hli# #nd th#
p#p#f #*rk #»i*ri#», Cmrmma e#m#hiti##  *#r# $##n ##t#hli#h#d 
in Chih#  ̂ c###i#t# with »#h##i*# #h#mh## and n#w#p#P»f»» 
m##tiy fiwmemd »hd »#b#idi»#d hy *##f#t fond# ##t in th# 
V#im»f ge#*mm*mt,^
la  <i#f#*»y, thin#»# y # ^ l» r ity  in#r##*#d mad ##«» r#i#ti#n» 
h#tw##a th#»# d##htri## *#f# *#$t eordiml. Chime, #$ th# hem#
#f CAAfwdimmimm, #yp*#i#d t# emny a#rmmh#.  ̂ ImMr##, # 
phii#*#ph#r whd## temahimg# ###r$#d im m*n#r#m» #diti@m# 
in p@#t*w*f wm* widely remd. Xevei# written ahemt
Chin# #dd#d t#  the pepmimrlty, end Chime## mrt wm# hi$hiy 
mpyrmimted,^ Them, of ommree, th# chiw*# refmmel t# #i$m 
th# "Diktmt", lent the# mm even #r#mt#r myp#mi, Thi# peried 
mi»o femmd m #r#mt mmmy Chim*# »t*&d$mt# mmd other good w ill
^ihfd,, io .
*̂Th# #%i»t#mtimii»t th##ght whieh fi«*ri#h#d mfter th#
Tremty ^Vermmiiie# hm# mmny poimt# mimiimr t# th# Cemfwimmieti# 
thomght* both thomght# pertmim to Mem m# m heimg im th# world 
of remiimm, mad thm# #v«a oa phiiomeyhicmi grommd# th# Gerwma# 
end Chime*# w#r# el*»#.
$M#rh#rt vom Dirk##m, Nomeow, Tokyo. Lomdomi Twenty Y#mf*
of Germmm for#im^ y#li#y ( W w A a T I m i w e r ^ ^ ^  '
  ̂ '
f t »  r#tar» fe f  th# trmd#
th# ChlA#»# #$f# giv$a@ th# a#fm#a#* th#y m#f#v*d @#r##a 
imr#»t»#at* #ad 0#f#ma militmfy »dvi»#fm t# bmlld th#lf 
lAd**tfy #ad »miy*
Chlam, with h#f $yMgw&thi#$# bmdly a##d#d
foreiipi #%plt#i. &h# ml## m##d#d ##A##lld#tl#a of h#f 
«mtloBml gwwwrm##at* Added t# th### d iffleeltl*##  Chia###
or@#al##tlm did m#t W #hf t#  effet meey y###lhllltie#  
t e  fofelga he#lh#####a. Th# Vefmmf Reÿwehlle pet #p#el#l 
et#dlt* et th» dlepeeel ef Qetema eeteheat# enpmged la the 
Chia» tfed# la eêdet te  e llev le t#  th### d lfflee ltl# # .^  
OtgealeetloR# eeeh e# th# Chie* Stedl#* Ge##ll#h*ft w#f# 
created t# edvlee ea th# $l*<M&#rm* trede#
thertly after th# egremwmt wee elgeed h#tw##a Gereehy med 
Chine le  192!̂ # eeteel tred# betweea th# tw# eceetrle# bepea.  ̂
Ceptela Bertea Rtmla, e ferw r û#r*#e erey officer mad leter 
e beeleeeewLdf wee ment te  Ghle* for rew matériel# te  b# m##d 
la w#imer ladaatry, Klela prwtleed te eecer# fre* Chlw 
conelderehl# qeaatltl## ef th# métal# aeeded la Qermaay* 
lncledla@ taaget#* amd wolfram.? I* emehaa## Crormamy *a# 
te  #aM)ly Chlaa with we#pom# aad military eapplle# needed 
te  rehalld her aray. By th# 1930*# Klmlm and ether haeln###* 
ma* were doing a eleeahl# haal*### i* Chlma.
< B lo c h ,  1 7 ,
?v#m Olrkoen# 171,
0#rm#R w#r# In their trede hy th#
Qermmn efffeere #he eerved m Okieng Mei##h*h*e etmff »e 
»dvl##r$. Thee# 6#f#en ^ fN e r e  hed reytmeed the hmeeien 
mdvieer# fired by m#r#hel Chieag in heeeeee ef eemmu&tet 
eetiv ity , Chtmng*# e*e##t$m* egetnet th# Bel#h#ei#t* ##re 
very popeier in 0#rmm#y *t th# time end the Oewmn mrmy hed 
gmined greet eU itery  preetig# in Oiine^
On# ef th# f ir e t  »dvi*»r# te  Chieng #%# €#1. Me% Bener 
nhe errived in heeenber *927  ̂ bet retnmed te  Oemeny in the 
epring ef igiSB. Th# Weiner Repehiie did net fever hi# 
echeming fw  # n iiitery  edvieery greep in Chine, end Cel* 
Beeer ve# fereed te  *ign e »p##*ei etetement t#  th# #ff#et 
thet hi# vimit #a# of e e tr ie t iy  privnt# netwre* denying 
renef# th*t th# heiehev^hf bed $ny ee tiv itie#  in Chine.^
Seen efter thi# *tmt###nt vm# elgned, Beeer end #w&* ether 
retired miiitery effieer# vent bdek te  Chin# end eigned 
centrect* with Chinng Rei4*#hd(k.
' 17* expiein^  'that'"it" ###w to him^on "
beei# ef r#ii#hi# reeerte thet ##rt#^  Gemen indnetrfei gr#«ŷ #
of ChiA#*# hmtieeei Army*
%ieeh, U* Aieo# Mr* iiereid j .  Gerden, in hi# book*
that Cei* Bener end e o#ftnin i##j* #m((*t ##r# th# p e iit ie e l  
propegmndi#t# end recm itere enong thh eoidier# end vetenm# 
ef th# Xeyp Peteeh, 1920* It eemid very v e il he that thi# i# 
«A# ef the mejer reeeee# v ly  tb# W#iner gevemment ve# egein#t 
th# ##tebii#h##nt of e m iiitery mieeien in Chine. Mr. JehnW. 
#h#$i#r*B#nn#tt, in hi# beek# Th# N#m##i* ef Po##r (Kev York: 
St. Mertin*# Pr###, in# ., 19$I#77^rrrwR%riA#Tc#i. Beeer
dering hie enil# in Berep#, vhieh reeelted  from hi# e e tiv ity  
in the M#pp*Pet#eh, eret#  en eeeeent ef th# Peteeh. Der 15 MSr# 
iBeriin, n/d).
lA Chin*, Chi*ng *#$ under from h is
polit%e&% ememy W*ng Chlmg'*##!, who proteeted tha t Oerma
advlaere ##r# *## i# tiag  Ch&aag ta  th# efvU  w&r#. Th# wetmar
Republic mad# th# fc llcw lag  d ec la ra tio n :
I) I t  la  amtrue th a t  the German geremment haa 
aent m ili ta ry  a f f lc e r*  t e  (%hlna* Th* German 
gwarnmaat did net recemmend any. They have 
been ae lee ted  in  Germany by Chiane Ral^ahek or 
by h i*  deiwitlea in Germany#
2) The German government, a* a m atter cf 
p r in c ip le , doe* n e t fav er German* p a r tic ip a tin g  
in m ili ta ry  action#  abremd#
3) German# going abroad t e  face the  haaarda of 
m arfare are doing *e a t  th e i r  emn r ia h  .  . ,,1 0
Thi* a ta t  ament aeemed to  a a tia fy  the anemia* of the Weimar
IWpabli* *h* apparen tly  ameepted th# exiatenn# of a m ilita ry
mieeien in  China aa e ie tin g  Chlang Rai#*heh,
When hamer a rriv ed  in  Shanghai in  192T, ha immediately
men the  favor ef ^ Im eee  m ili ta ry  a a th e r i t ie #  a* a eme''time
eaberd inate  of ta d e m d # ^ , and he breeght w ith  h i#  th e
advantege of eaperieme# in  h ev le t Ra»#ia where he had aerved
a# ad v iee r to  th# Red Army a f te r  World war 1, Bamer ma* very
fa m ilia r  w ith the a treag th*  and weakneeee* e f th e  B eviet m ilita ry
eyetem, a knowledge of g re a t va lae  in  hi* werh in  Chinn, A fte r
he had ee tab liahed  hlm eelf and th e  o th e r r e t i r e d  German o ff leer#
(he had bromght w ith him an e n e f f ie la l  Reiehawehr groap nembering
lOBieeh, 1%,
6
he erfmmged fer the pree*r(»g ef mmttie#* 
end m llitery eqelpmeat.^) Col* Beeer pleyed en ii%*orte%xt pert 
In the institut ion of e military inteiiigeno# eyetem, a 
puhlioity propram for the Chinese Natiemei Army end a scheme 
of organised military tra in in g , 12 Me created the Whampoa 
military academy near Canton. In 1929 he died of amallpex 
eentracted from germ# placed w  a hot towel by Chineae enemiee.U
One thing should be understood about the military advieer# 
under Bauer* they did not go to China to build an army apainet 
Japan but to help Nanking fight th# Ceawmlet force# In China 
and it  waa not until after 1933 that the German government 
brought the military miaaiem in China under it# influence.
Bven then the adviser# remained in China under private contract#,
^ IS a m r a . »  4 .
1 ^ , f .  Wu, A Military Mietory of WipN̂ rn 192k*I9h9
(Arinceton, New Jereeyt
Bauer* an#»ti#e Chief of Operation# under Field Marahal Brick 
v#& Ludandorff* wa# regarded a# an expert in art 11 lory, 
engineering and chemietry. He had received hi# doctorate from 
th# Uhiveraity of Berlin and ma* the author of aevarai book* 
t^iading the much. raapeeted Dor Oroaaa lirian in Feld and mwirnat, 
Ki$ experience Inciaded aervi'WrWtth^^lha^^wv pdtfwh^l*
of fkldar Wilhelm 11 and important »taff poet», fo lit ica ily »  
he ma# an arch*royali»t and had been exiled for hi* part in th# 
Mapp putach but ma$ later pardoned, la  a* advieory capacity 
he had aerved in th# government# of Auatrla* Soviet Ru#*ia,
Bpain and Argentina on matter# ranging from military aviation 
to combatting loeuet plague#.
13claud# A. Bu*## War and Diplomacy in Baatem A#la (Nam 
York# Th# mcMillan
l^Lamrenee K» Rooinger, "Far Ba#t#m Foiicy under H itler"* 
if ic  A ffair# XI (Decemhar 1936), 1̂23.
I t ,  Col, Rrfebel, recelvod 
the bleeainge of German Indaetry on hie mleelon in China bmt 
be eoom reelgned and #a# replaced by General Veteell*^^ 
bla arrival in Cbinâ  Weteell advleed Cbiang Kai#̂ ehek on 
etrmtegy for two of hie caN^lgney bat tbi# a«lvloe wee not 
cloeely followed, At thle etege, German advleere did not 
bmve maeb Inflaencef for Cbieng believed fopalgner# to be 
incapable of taking into acooant the habita end ceetow  of 
the people and the peycholog^ of the Chinee# eoidier; beeide# 
they were not fa liy  ecqaeinted with the terrain. In general# 
Chi&ng wee eomewbat ekepticel of their graap of the particaler 
e i t a e t i o n # ^ ^
tSp, F, Lin* Lt, Col* Rriebel# who wae one of
the fira t Xaaie to dome to China* aen*rdimm te  Kart Bloch# 
p. IS# had been a namber of the Germmn Armietice Commiaefna.
He bad taken part in Hitler*# Bearhali Fatamb in 1928# and 
in 19^  he beaan# ChWng Kai^^ahek*# advieer bat wa# replaced 
in Anonat of 1930* Me then held an important dlplematic 
peat In Shanghai ant 11 1941 ahen be wa# replaced to  become 
Chief of perawnei in the German Foreign Office*
General George Wetaell had been a member of the Grw###** 
Generalatab# th# aapreme headgmartera. He originated the pian 
by whieh the Italian Army #aa defeated in 1917 and after
World War i  he oecapied a key poet am Chief of the Troop#
Office (Chef de# Trappenaamte#)* At that time hi# repatation
oatehmen von Blmmberg and von fritach. He wa# the aathor ef
Per Bandeakrlee which wa# widely read by military expert».
Ke ha& i i t t i h  In tere#t in  po litic#  bat wa* a man of action.
I6r. P. Lia* 76,
While Wet*ell w&e in China an adviser to Chlang Kaf»*h#k, 
Hitler came to power In Germany and Japan moved once more In 
the Far % et. The Japanese army captared Maneharla and# whâa 
the League of Nations condemned her action*, Japan le ft that 
body. In Oetober 1933, Germany walked oat of the dlaarmamant 
conference* and aha and Japan were le ft  in diplomatic isolation. 
They f e l t  th is laolatlen particularly when R%»*la, their 
greatest enemy, a llied  herself with France and joined the 
L e a g u e .
After a few year* of service as adviser to Chlang %i*ahak#
Weteeli'a too s tr ic t Prvaalan attltada caaaed d lf f lc a lt le s . In
May 1933# General Wetaell wrote to hi# former aape îw"# Genaral
Man* von Aeeckti one-time Chief of the Belehewehr (1919*1906).
He said in part*
The Chinese govemmmnt has extended its  invitation to  
prominent personage## evidently with the Intention of 
promoting anderatahdlng and aeeklng wwpld Interest In 
China through such persons. Ceneernlng the Invitation 
extended to Your Enoelleney# there was also th# #xpeetatl<m 
of lemming abeat the vainmhle German ayatems of 
organlaatlSa aM above a l l ,  military kn@s*how and 
Imaginative#,*?
Weteeii continued In the same le tter , saying that "The Marshal 
has often asked me about Your Excellency*# work in the building 
of the Relchawehf, .
^?Frledrleh Rabenaa# Seeckt, Am# *eln#m When. 1918*36 
(Lelpslgi V, Hasse & Koehler Verlag# 19^)# E?b. '
On hi# f ( f# t  v is i t  t s  CblAs# vsn &ssckt wss ssksd by 
Chlmng Msl^shsk to  make s report of the sltu&tiom. He v is ite d  
m ilita ry  schools and local governmental organisâtIons, and on 
h is re ta rn  to  Germany he le f t  a lengthy report on what he f e l t  
were the weaknesses and the methods neceseary to  correct these 
defic iencies. Von Seeckt stressed the point that for China 
the righ t coarse was not the speedy creation  of a large army 
bat ra th e r the creation  of a few well-ktrained and well*ar«ed 
troops. China did not have too few troops under arms, bat fa r  
too many, ander a l l  so rts of garnirais often working a t cross 
purposes,
Von Seeckt continued in h is report th a t the present 
management of command authority  and the position  of the o fficer 
corps in the Chinese army were in need of improvement. Govern* 
ment aathority  coaid only be b a i l t  an army under a single 
command. The p rercgaislte  fo r each a command was that the officer* 
be employed accoNing to  aaiferm principle# not under the control 
of the indivldaal division commanders and other generals. Thi* 
program ehoald be applied throaghemt the coantry with the 
re q e is ite  ruthleseness toward the c(mtrary in terest#  of 
individuals. In no circumstances would i t  do fo r the higher 
au th o ritie s  to  work independently of erne another as had been 
the case in the recent engagement# with the .lapanese,
Demart meat of g ta te , Docmmemt# om German fore ion 
Trautmann to  Foreign M ln îî l^ ,  26,
10
I t f* tQ note the mewaef im ehlch vw  Seeckt
prepeeed the t the Chimeee Natle&ml Army he reerpemieed. îa 
order te  de#% with the deficteaciee e ffec tiv e ly , ven Seeekt 
prepeeed the c rea tiea  ef e #e#<;#iled imetrmctlea hrfgede, Thi# 
brigede wemld net he #e *mch fe r  tre ia iag  th# treep# e$ Y*** 
giving efficere  im the middle and higher peeitions eeppldywatery 
tre la iag  t#  make cp for the deficiemciee in th e ir  peat tre ia ing  
end te  eqaaiie# th e ir  capeh iiitie#  # ith  theee ef the yeeager 
effieer#  aew beiag tra iaed  ia Haakiag aader the gaidaace ef 
Oermaa advieere, la  th ie  mey ea# ceald alee beat cope with 
the probim  tha t the yoamger effieer#  traiaed  ia  Naakiag veaid 
net operate e ffec tiv e ly  with the treopa becaaae th e ir  eaperier# 
did ae t have the earn# tra ia in g . Oeaeral vea Seeckt wmated a 
tra ia iag  brigade to  cmaaiat ef two ia faa try  regimeata, oae 
a r t i l le r y  bakaliea, eae eagineer, oae tank aad oae eigaai 
compaay, aad eae eqaadrm of cavalry, Vm Seeckt fa rther 
pr^oeed aeeigaiag te  th i#  brigade aa advieory mtaff of older, 
w ar-tried efficer*  aad, of cearae, a namber of yoimg men for 
iadividaal traiaiag# I t  waa aeceaaary fo r theae troopa to  
have adequate arma availab le . 21
Am for the Chineae defeaae ladoatry, von Seeckt wrote 
th a t the material ae fa r delivered from the araenala waa in 
a large part inadequate; therefore, for the time being the 
Chineae woald have to  re ly  on importing arme from abroad, althoagh 
i t  waa adviaable gradaally to  inereaae the armament fao teriea
21
11
wlthla China, Th# ##tahll#hm#nt #f th i*  typ# #f f*ct#fy 
conId h#*t he managed on th# ha*l* of aaggeatlon* fro# th#
European armament fir# # . I t  maemt only expenelv# to lnyort 
arm# and #mm*nltlon hat alao danger#*# In #### clro%m»tanc##.^^ 
Thi# f l r a t  v la l t  to  Chin* mlth It#  r##*ltant report mm# 
very pl#a#lng to Chlang Kal-ahek and h# paid von seeckt hand<" 
$o#ely for hi# effort# .^^  Ev#n though th# t r ip  ma# #appo#edly 
a private a f f a ir ,  von Seeckt mat acc#eq»anled by a Major Tree 
and met %)y a Herr Klein In Canton mher# the## tmo algned a 
cm trac t for an arm# factory.^f: Shortly a f te r  von Seeckt returned 
to  Germany, Wetaell resigned A"om hi# poet a# advlmer aad 
%>r. Chu Chia*h*l, then a cabinet member, dlepatched a telegriw  
on October 2# 1933* to  von seeckt* mrltlng# "General Wet##11 
ha# contemplated re»lgm»ti#a. He feel# that he 1#  no Itmger 
able to  work for the Marahal Chlang. Would p refer a man of 
year backgro*nd,"%
General ven Seeckt reported  to  the German Foreign O ffice 
th a t  Chlang %al*#hek had sen t him an In v ita tio n  to  become th# 
m ilita ry  ad v iee r, Th# German fo re ig n  m ln la ter re p lie d  th a t each 
a c t iv i ty  va# p o l i t i c a l ly  incompatible v l th  th# p resen t German 
po licy  and asked th# general to  dec line  the Chinese marshal*# 
p r o p o s a l . T h i s  v levpoln t on th e  p a rt of the German Foreign
    ,i m , » # # # ,* ewm,,,,,. imw ...
F. Liu, 92.
2W$ae Chapter I I I .
P. L ia , 97.
^^Slcker# mémorandum, Oct. 19, 1933, D.G,P.F. C, I I ,  23.
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he p e rtly  explelAedi la  th a t the ^rmm* gevermmeat 
did met meat t#  heem* tee  epealy ImveXved with au m t. Bet 
wee Seeekt*» flrm t t r ip  had wide aew$p#P#f eeeerege#^^ altheegh 
the mUaletry f e l t  vea teeekt wee tee  l# ^ r te e t  e pereen fe r 
#eh e jeh.
ie  eerly heweeher, the Chleeee emheeeeder pet preeeere 
en the @ef#ma ymrelgm Mlmletry# In e eeevereetlên with the 
derme* fereig* mlmlet^^* the Chinee# eherge d*#ffelrée 
memtlemed that thlamq Rel##heh already attached great 
liyartaaee te  deaeral we* teeeht^a retar* te  China. The 
thlaeee dlplamat eaplalaed that* eweiythlag emeldwred,
(leneral Wetaell wee eemewhat tee ^aaala* fer Chlmeee 
eendltlm# aad that he wae ae leager la a geed pealtlem 
te  fw lf ll l  hia mlaalem heaaaae he had made maay eoemlee 1* 
Oilaa. The Chlaeae dlplee*t»*te ehew what damage the dermane 
might aaffer If herr warn teeaht were te  dealla# the *hemerahie 
eall^'^lmdlaated that derma* m ilitary adwleere earreatly had 
great Imflaemee ea the aa;^lyl*g af arm# a*d war materiala te  
the <%l*e«* Watlemal army# bat that the preaeh were eeeklag 
thla wery pr^ ltabie trade, Perhapa It waa mere te  the pelmt 
that damerai wem Beeeht had pleaaed the hhrahal jaet a#
Cel, Baaer had dame Ât 1927* The Chlmeee eharge d#affalree 
aaked that the derma* Ferelgm Office aae It# imflaemee with 
WW& Seeeht te  get him at leaet te  make another w lelt te  China.^
^^bem aa, p. 679.
by Bhlew» Nov. 8, 1933, D.@.P,P.. C, II* 8$.
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vm  *#$ckt ghren permlèmlon te  @e 
t*  Chin* #Ad Ckfmag mdvi$#r, M# plamaed
to  t%k$ with hi# two fofmof ##m#w% @o##r»i$* vo# y#ik#Ah»w#oa 
»Ad Fowpoi.^ $:##* th# old g##»f#i# vm  w## i# hod
h#%ith# h* yi#«m#d to  r# t#r#  to  Qoywmy ## #00# #* po*$ihi#.
R* wowid i##v# W » F#ik##h###o# &#d Fh*qM»i hohlmd i#  Chi#» 
mad oomtimm# t#  # f f# r  mdwio# to  th #  {^i##m# » f#y  thw om ^ 
th#»$ two g###f»iO .^^
Th# t#*h of f##fj%m#i#i#9 th# Chi#### »p#y mad th# Chi#### 
d#f«a$# iMmmtfy prowod t#  h# too ###h fo r th# goaormi# Dwrimg 
th# homt of th* Chi#### ###### h# #p#Ah m f*w moath# *# North 
Chimm# *#c#rt#d hy » Chi»### gmahomt* Th# Joh took ##w*r»i 
#o»th# mad V0» Sooekt io f t  Chi»» for th# loot tim# i»
0#»#r»i VO» Fmik#»hm»##n h*o»»# h#»d of th# ##r#i»» w ii to ry  
miooi#» »»d th# mi### frioad  of Chi*»# M#i*#h#k.
T%# Wow York Ti»## of *»y iT38* otmt## thmt c«»*f»i
von F»l#lii&#!W# to O&i»» wid# #*^ri#»e# in mimomt
ovory fio id  of miiitmry mmtivity whieh hmd b##» g»i»#d on th# 
omotom m»d w#$t#r» fromt* i» world Wmr i# Mi# hnowiodg# of 
##^i#»t»i wtyo r##»lt#d fro# two y#*r# h#f#r# Worid ##r % 
mp#»t »* C#f»»» Miiitmry Attmmh# in Tokyo pr#m##d#d by th# 
Sehooi of Orient»* dtadi## in Boriin mad foiiowod by doty 
in i#*7-l8 *# Chief of $t»ff of th# Tmrklmh Afni#* end imtor 
*# mill tory yi#»iy#t#»ti»fy »t th# 0#rm»n E»b»##y in f#t»»bmi. 
M# fotirod fr#» th# h#i#h#w#hr in *930 with th* ronk of f» i i  
9#»#r*i.
%» *93# 0#»#f»* von y»*k#nh»»»#A h*#»m# th# mhiof *dvi##r 
to Chimng hl*i«#h#k W&imh yomiti#» h# hold wmtii *938* %# wo# 
f#**ii#d to  mmtiv# doty in *939 myon th# owthromk of Worid W#r 
*I mnd »#rv#d »# th# niiitmry g#v#r»#r in Bolgimm ontil 19h4*
%*h#n»m» ?iO*
11*.
lA B$fUn # d iffe ren t t#m  In 1934* Nkjer 
@#A*r#l Oehlm *e# appointed m llltefy #tteeh( la Berlin*
Oehlme ee# Inetreeted by th* Jepeneee ermy to  apprelee the 
e te b li l ty  ef the Reel regime^ po ten tiel e b l l l t le e  ef the 
Carmen erey end the prehehle e t t l t * ^  df the Rermem pohl Ic If 
QereeAy eheeld e te r t  e eer egelnet the Beelet imieR*3^ Oehlme 
end ven Rlhhentrep la  the mwkentl## h*d hecem* eleee fflende* 
end through th i#  frlendehlp the jepeaeee army eentrlved te  
m lA tala it#  re la tlm ah lp  with ^rmany* The jepan#»# la  th e ir  
d lp leeatle  laelatlw* had feand a p e ten tla l partner agalaat 
th e ir  eaemy* Aaaela*
The Japaaeee army waa# Ilk# the Rermaa» preoeeapled e lth  
the aemlng ef ear agalnet the Berlet ^ I m  and japaneaa a tten tlen  
eae dlreeted toward #ermmy la  ^ d e r  te  negetlate a e leaer 
a lllaaee  te  reiaferde j%paA$à m ilita ry  atrength la  the Far 
Baet*3& i# reality#  tlw ^paneae army wanted the aappert ef
3^1ateraatlehàl W lltary Trlhmeal f#r the Far Baet, $#g>reme 
Ceaaaader ef the stilled Fere##, jadaammt aad Qalhlea# (Tekye# 
War Mlniatry, Tekye# dhpaa)#
1̂9, 738.
la  ay eplalea It 1# deahtfai# hewever# that at the time 
(1934*3^) th# Weraaa army had ahaaged It# wlewpelat and pel la lea 
toward haa#la* jiaaerdlng te  tawremee Reelager* In hi# artla le  
#y*r Baatera Pel ley under Kit 1er* # the Oeraan aray#a pel ley 
$lnee 1916 had been te  aweld fighting a war an two front»* 
Cenalderlng Franee @emany#a enemy# Relahawehr leader# carried 
ferward energetleally th# e ff le la l Wefmr pelley ef frlendahlp 
with the Bewlet Whien, When h it le r  earn# te  power, the Aelehawehr 
did net eha^e It# fandanwktal poaltlen. Ita former chief, 
Oeneral van Beeekt, argued that eemaay aa#t never Join Japan 
and other power# la encircling Waaalai on the contrary, alne# 
Rational Beelallem e#ppre##ed Ceommlam #o vlgeroaaly at home,
It meed not fear Internal reperça##!on# from a Bowlat alliance*
@$rm»Ay th# mad th# Chia#*# R#y#hli#
ml*#A#tiA9 Jhpmn### ywhlle #md #fth  th# mlafmm
on p#rt#3(̂
##» ht# chmae# to onc^roi# th# &#vl#t TMIon mad 
#»w la  th# JBmpmaem# pr#p#mml m rmmi chmag# la  world polltlo#* 
Th# fhhfmr d#oW#d thmt "th# dl#am##ioa# with th# Jmpma### 
$hemld h# hmadl#d hy Jo##hlm voa Rthhontrop oad#r h i# , th# 
p(hf#r## p#f##aml ##p#rvi#loa".^^ *h#a voa *#armth, th#
<)#rmma formlga *lal#t#r* m#atl#a#d th# F$hf#f$# d#ei#i#a to  
Mmmhmkojl, th# Jh]iW!%### mmhm#*md#r, i t  *## d##ld#d th#it @nd#r 
th##* $lr#mm#tmno## 0#a*rml 0#hlmm woald h* d*#i@amt#d to  
t#h# #*r# of th# *#90tl# tloa#  with IWrr voa hihhmatrop, Th# 
Q«Tmm f#r#l@h a la l* t# r m*W th# Jmpw*#*# m*hm##md#r m@r$#d 
a#t to  la t#rf#f#  wm###*»mrlly# A# m mmttor of frnot, th# 
pr*po##d dl#o###l#a# did aot ###« to  h# of gr#mt Imgportmae# 
t#  th# #:f*ma mad j*^ma#m# formlga Off 1###* Thmŷ  voa 
*#mrmth mad Mmmhmkojl, thomqht thmt th### tmlk# mould 
oaly r##olt la  m formai polltlom l#op#rm tl#a mad m poollag 
of laform#tl<m. Bmt th# Qofwrn h#l#h#ehm###lior, d##pit# 
wm h#mr#thf# mdvlm# to  th# moatrmry, wm# d$t#rmla#d to com# 
to  torm# with th# *UWPy*a* of th# hmmt." I t  wm* #v#a yommlbl# 
thmt, Im #rd#r to gmla Jmjuwrn*# frImadmhlp mad moopormtloa.
3^0r .  Pmal hmhwmr#, % i#  Mma hlhhmatromi HI# Wf# mad 
Tim## (Now York# Jmllma Mmÿmĥ r, Ih#„ "'l?!), '
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therefor# l##l#tlng or oAcircllRg th# Soviet Uhion, he could 
mek# #n #1 Hence with her.3  ̂ All during th# yeer 1936 von 
Rlhbentrop end Oehlne negotieted In en ettengp̂ t to come to 
term* elth  #a# enother.3(^
then. In 1936, to th# $nrprle# of the Oermen Foreign 
Office* the $0"Celled Antl#ComlAt#rn Feet me# eoncleded 
between jepen end Qermeny. It me# omteluded by von Rlbbentrep 
on hitler*# order# end von Wel$e#oker wrote leter# In hi# 
memoir#* thet th# ^m en Foreign Office ire# net brought into 
the negotietl#n#.3^ It cm$l#ted of e pnbllcleed e# well e$ 
e eecret egreement. The pnbllcleed gert of the Antl*C@mlAtem 
Feet eteted thet the centrectlng pertlee egreed to Inform eech 
other of th# ectiv ltle*  of the Commmlt# mtemetlonely te  
confer on neceeeery mee#nr#$ for defence ecwl to teke ench 
meeetere# In d ee#  eoeperetlen end join tly  Invite third 
netlcnc either to tel*  defencfee meecnre# In cenfermlty with 
the Antl#4omintem Feet or t*  pnrtlclpete within the Fect.3^
^^Acc^'dlng to the U.S# Fer Begwrtment* Decement# on heel 
Cwenlreny end An#re*»l#n* II# (Vemhlngten* D.iüf.#1' ëWeëw 
m#t Bëreeà # F* ko0**when wen Rlbbentrop
#l#ned the Antl^emlntefn Feet for Oermèny In Berlin in 1936* 
he we# net* In November 1936, the Oermen ferelcn mlnleter bet 
«Imply hitler*# epeclel echeeeeder Flenlpotentiery while 
embeeeeder to  Lenden.
3$hm#t von Fel##%#her* Memoir#* tr . by John Andrew# 
(Chie»g*$ henry Regnery CemFw* #9 1̂1* 116. Von VelecÈcker 
trie# t# Impj  ̂ thnt the Foreign Office wn# mot gnllty #r did 
not knew nbewt the cemclnelon ef the Feet bet Dr. Schwnr# 
clelm# thet won Meereth knew of theee negetletlene.
3^Int. Mil. Trlb. for the Far Beet, h9,339.
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The ##cfet te  the f* c t pfovldee
th*t th# t*e g«v#fam#at#* f«ee#ml*KAg tha t th# $ovl#t Ü&lCA 
1$ «ûfkl&g th# T##%l*#t(#A #f th# g#»l #f th# C#mf»t#ra*
#A# ###tW t# #*# It* #fhy f#f th*t #***## y#f##br# thmt thi* 
f##t thf«*t#m# th# #%l#t##e# @f th# p*rtl#» *W werW )#### I* 
g#m#f*l *Ad #### thmt #h#*ld m# #T th# pmfti## b# *»pp###h#*ly 
*ttm#W4 #f thf**t#*#d by th# $#vl#t th* #th#r ymrty
*#r##* R#t t* #*rfy ##A *#y *#*»#»## #ht#h ##*id yeit##* th# 
yq#It%#* th# ###i#t lW#aA b*t #111 l**##l*t#ly #«m**it o* 
*#*#*#*# t* yy###f## th#lf #####* l*t#f*#t#, It f*yth#f yrovW## 
thmt th# ymftl#* #U1 met th# y##l*d #f th# mgrmmmmmt *md
vlth#mt **tml ##m*#mt e*m#l#&# y#lltl#ml tf#mtl#$ #lth th*
$##l#t iml#m #h*#h *# m#t ##mf#f# t#  th# *#t# lt #f th# mam###mt.^° 
lA *» i* m#v# #f th# #m##lwii#m #f th#
h*tl'<##$mt#yR pmmt ##* t*  th# ywhll# gfmdmmily #md
#mmhl#m#ly ###r th# ##w## th* ###k ######4lA§ th# elgmmtmy#.
I* th# Ytlkimmh# B$#hmet#i(* am mp#l###tl# h#mhilm# **him hht D#f 
h#t##hr* mm# #v#f th# l#*dlmg # ftle l#  #f W###W»#f 26# 1936»^^
^frmmk #11U#* Ikl#*. @#mmm*jm#m#$*# h#lmtl*a* i l 93&4 kO) 
<*## Y#fh« B##h*#a A #$#cl#tW ^"'**"^^' *' WumWM,
j# Toymhm# (#d*)»
(t#md#m$ OKfw# ih»lv#r»tty
y##tm#t#* 3%^# "tbmr# mm# hmmmrnmf# #m# pmlmt #f ##fl#m* 
14##1#*1##1 4l#m^*###mt h*tm##m th# Jmgmm### mmh th# Nmml# mmd 
thmt mm» th# *#*1 4#gmm #f th# ##y#yl##lty *f * hyp#th#tl#ml 
*lürymm̂  f*##« By Irmmlmml fv#mk #f fmrtmm#, thr## #f th# mmtlmm* 
t# iA#m th# ThlN Reich mm# <lymmm hy m ####mmlty y#Utl#ml 
imt#f##t#"M#»mm#ly th# jmy###»#, th# Mmgymf## mmd th# yimm#«wwm#f#
*y#mk#r# #f "mmm̂ hfymR** tmmgmmg##; mnd th# Mmml mmthofltl#* Im 
B#flim did thmlf h##t to got thi# *t#*hllmg hl##k hy dmhhlrng
th#$# frlemdly mmtleo# *h#m#P#fy m# m #*t#mt of rmolml
#mmAl###mt, All th# »**## m #y##w mhomt th# d##tlmy of th# 
Whit# %»## t#  hmmf th# fml# #*## th# $ d*llv$r#d hy %ltl#f 
mt Awloh #m Jkmmmfy 26# 193m# df#m m yyotomt frmm th# rw#lgm 
Off Im# $ymh##mmm im Tokyo.*
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Th!$ #%# probably mmay
thmt tfmd# rmtmtimm* with Chlom might h# hmrmmd,
Chlmmg Xmî mhmh hmd m»de grmmt pymgrmmm Im Chlnm mgmlmmt 
th# Gammwmimt which w#y# f«re#8 %c wltMrmw mom# mix
hmmdfW mil## #md t#  f#*##tmhHmh th#mm#lv#* Im th# w##t#rm 
prowim## of Xhmmgmi,^ Thi# cmmpmigm hmd h##m comtly Im 
fcmmmfc#* mmd m#m* hmt #h# Ghim### meldloT# w$r# #mg#r f#r 
may mctiom mgmlmmt Wpmrn* Om th# other hmmd* ^ im ^  %i#^h#h# 
who h$d r#c#iv*d hi# trmtmimg la  Apma* ###m#d to  do aothlmg 
mgmlm$t th# Aipma### lawmd#fo,
la 0#c#mh#r 1T38 th# Ghfa### *#ldl#rm flmmlly mtt##^t#d 
to  mmk# th o lr  di»##mt#mt kaomm to  Chlmag %l*mh#h, Th# Chlaom* 
mmr#h#l wm# kidamppod from him h#t#l room. @#a*rml Ghmmg 
Mmmeh'fllmmg hmd kl<Wpp#d Ghlmag mad ho pat fo rth  th# dommadm 
of him troop# thmt Ghimag roorgmmlr# th# hmaklmg govoramoat 
mad permit mil pmrtlmm to  mhmro th# jo la t roopoaolblilty# thmt 
mil kladm #f c iv i l  wmr# h# mt«q»p#df thmt l####dlmt#ly th# 
pm trlotlc lomdorm who w#r# mrromtod la hhmaghml h# r#lomm#d* 
thmt th# pmtrlotl# mowomwmt *f th# p##)#  h# ommamlpmtod, Wmt 
th# p o li t ic a l  froodom of th# poopl# be mmfogomrded, thmt th# 
w ill of Dr. tma Tmt-moa b# emrrlod omt, mad thmt m hotloaml 
(mlwrntlom Coaf#r#ac# b# cmllod i#m#dlmt#ly.% Chimag hhl*mh*k 
wm# r#l#m##d mahmrmod la  m few dmy# bat th* mrmy remmlaod la  
a matlaoam mood.
^Ahrthar Berrlodml# Kolth* Th# Cmm*#» of the War (Loadoa* 
Themm# D#lmoa mad tom#* L td ., IW O T T B . '
4^Lm*r#ac# K« Pomlm^r* Chla#:# Pmrtlm# r # llc l# #  (Priacotoa, 
how Jormey# Priametoa miw#r$%ty Ÿ r % /  W W # ZL
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Mo$t of ChWn#*# treaÿg had bean ejaatad from thafr 
homalmmd la the nmrth #md *#r* in th# mympmthy mlth
th# $f#A kldmmyp#f$ and mlth th# Chlm#*# Gommmlmt #ttltmd# 
#@»%m*t Jmpmm* Th# Chi##* ##ldi#r# #hj##t#d # tr# # ly  t# h # l#  
*#ley#d #6#lm#t th# ###cmll#d *R#dm", wh# m#r#, of momr»#* 
la th# vmngmmrd of th# #atl'*J#p#m### movement. In #ddltlom* 
there m#r# had f##llhc# hromght #  by «hwrtmge# In pay and 
rmm#f* thmt the c omanilef^lx ^ h le f Intended to  penfeh the If 
Imek e#l«id^emnmnl*t ##ml hy tfm n efeffl#  them to # #  ef 
the eemthern peeelneee.W^
In meeeydmnee with th# pel ley of m nnlted fyent mgmlnmt 
the jmpmn#*# mrmy In # # h m f In* th# Chin#»# Commnnlet* had 
m**#elmt#d th#nete*» with th# eentf#il gmeef nment  and with a 
nenwpmfty ofganlamtlen emlled th# "All China êalwmtlon 
Ammwlatlan" W&leh emmleted of a nanher ef leeai anti#
AKpane## mnlen* that had apfmnp #p In different part# of 
China
IBarly In 193? the japan### Aeantmm# Army, #tatlon#d In 
Nanchmrla, waa determined te  ereate a aerie# of amtonomom# 
haffer mtatea In order te  preteet japan*» Intereat# In th# 
far Ea»t, Theae atat## weald he ereated la Inner Mongolia 
and la Perth China a# preteetlem for the rear ef the Aeantm# 
Army in a war agalnat th# tewlet iimlen. Thla haffer aene 
weald be am additional enema# for th# japanea# off leer# to
Wnmt, Mil. Trlb, for the Par Caat, 1^8,626*7,
^*^eynb#e, p. @$3.
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that they war* fighting agafaat th* CMmaalat cam*# aaA 
tha# raaaiv# aid from Oormaay. Al#*. th# Japam#** army wa# 
convtaead that J&paa*# <wm good China ma*t he compelled t#  
cooperate ecaaaaleally aad pelltdoally with Jtpani that 1#, Im 
Japaaeae eye*, th# Ciwmmmlet l̂ed# amti«*jkpaa##e movameat# la 
China with their ecoaomlc hoycotta* agltatlom and violaAce mmat 
coma to an Chl«a$ w  rather Chlang Nal-^ahah, w et
accept JMpama*# help In the flpht agalnet Cammmalam. To aach 
demand* *» th***f really amoamtlap to  h&paneae domlnatlom of 
China* almoet a ll  Chine*#* no matter hew weeh they dlaagreed 
with each othar* ware aaltad in aalld «ypoattlom.
jfapanaae plan* to  eliminate the Commentât moaament in 
China and to create haffer atate* date from the early 1930*#,^^ 
There waa then a strong element within the Rwantang Army which 
thot^ht that the mlllta%y ahoald take the lead in dealing with 
the Chinaae a* had heen dome in Mâwharia in the Mahden Incident, 
In Dacamher 193^# the Kwantang Army had diapatchcd to th* War 
Miniatry in Tokyo a propaganda plan mad# in cantaa^lation of 
the jhpanaaa aray*# advanc# Into China prepar* In the follewln#
47Th# f  ivalry hatwaan Japan and the Sowlat Union wae not 
exactly new* #lnm* Rmaala had ohtalnad amaaaa to  the Pacifia 
in th# ninataanth camtary* Japan had fa it  th# need to protaat 
haroalf. Th# %aa#o*Japama$e War# 190 #̂ 1$ an aacallant exaapla 
of thi* riwalry which again cam# to a head in th# 1930*# whan 
japan took ower tbAchewria.
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Bwath* Hlfotm* the Jkp****# fo relga * la l$ t# r in the Ok&d* 
cablaet# h&d established the policy of diplomatic cooperatlaa 
with the army## plaa* for N#*th Chlaa, With great eathaela** 
the Japaa### Mkaataae Army ploaaed fa r  the meaead ph##e of the 
Chlaeae c o n flic t, #ad an incident sim ilar to  Makdea wa# 
created and carried  oat#%&
The war between China dad japan had ac taa lly  began with 
the Mukden Incident In 1931 when japan #m*ce$*f*lly conqaered 
Maneharia, The period between 1931 and 1937 can be conalderad 
$a the f l r a t  pha** of japa**» plan to  overran China. The 
eecond pha»* of the plan a tarted  on Jaly ? , 1937, whan the 
japaaaa* troop# attacked the walled c ity  of Wanplme near 
Peiping follewia* the *Warco Pol* Bridge Incident.*49
On the night of j*ly 6* 1937, the japaaeae garrieoB atatiànad 
at takonchiae made an nnaaaal ma&eawer. Claiming that a 
japaneae aoldler *#* mi#*!**, the japemeae army commander 
demanded entry Into the c ity  of Waaplng to  condmct a aeafch. 
Fighting brok# o#t while the allegatlo* waa a t l l l  onder 
negotiation and on the afternoon *f July 8 , 1937, the 
japaaea# learned an altlmat##. in the battle which enaned, 
the japaoeee force# aeetained eabataatlal caaealtle# and on 
jaly 10 a trace wee agreed mpoa at the propoeal of the 
Japeaeee commander in the area.^O
k&lBt. Mil. Tflb. for tfe  far Beat. k8,&26*7 
49j^ld. ,  49,007.
48,488.
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The incident might have he*a regarded a* cloeed hat th is  
*a* not the lateatlon of the Rmantaag Army. Within twenty- 
fear hear* after the elamh, large **lt# #f the Jap#ae»e Hmantang 
Army began to cenverg* apen the area, amd the Japaaeme pat 
ferth new demand* on the Chlneae army to withdraw. On J*ly 13, 
the J&pameae army general ataff decided that If the Chlneae 
army received relafercemeht*, reaelat# eatlan weald have to  
he taken to meet the altaatloa. The Ghiaaae did not comply 
with the Japaneaa demand# and fighting reaamed at lakoaehlao 
OB Ik# follewfag day.^l
At the eathreak of fighting It aeemad te  the world that 
the sltaatlen  coaid he settled  wlthoat widespread conflagration^ 
After a l l ,  there wa* no declaration of war. At the end of 
ja ly  193? W#l#*#ek*r was vlalted by the japeaeae amhaaaader, 
Mmahakejl* who explained to the German aaderaeeretary that 
the Japaneae military action in China *a# *f oervie* to the 
German caaae of *ntl«Bol»h#vi*m. *ei$*#c%*g anewered that i t  
wa* act the bmeiaea# of Germany to figh t Commaala* in other
ceantrlea.^Z
The Chinese government ale* appealed to the German 
Foreign Office aboat the con flict. Chlaag tried to a*e 




Of #t l**$t to  ##t German #*pport b*h*nd Chin*. The Slao* 
J*p*a*#e co n flic t wa* not in the inter*** of Germany, #t*t*d 
th* Chin*** &m&*$$*d@f, mad Dr, Traatmana replied tha t he 
domhted whether the "email, admlnietrmtfve" Anti-Coalntera 
Pact gomld he meed to  inflaence Japan, Dr. Tramtmenn wa* 
iaetrmeted by the German government th a t the pact did not 
offer any baeie for the exertion of any Ênflaence.^3
23ikiea, a&*26»
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gpvikirÿrtjüiag #law#, ti*# tfwrkll%4*dt i*k IWi* t)i*
#%Wkll!&#it*a**k (%f $dhw* odT dliaeljpllawk la  kJaat
of tJhw# jpiala&wkd ?h# jbq*&Idla*;* atl; 1L&*
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#KBd *h*ll «kdüBifted ta» Lis* i** 1 Itkeirsf jp*PTp4MM» #dT %Jh$
jWwiki'# <%f CBhuKi&mti# ladkwHw»*#! jl4*awk #ad k*i* ;%r e*i»lR8
imwiatd )P#f iwNk *L*yih*d iBhwMWNk* lyaek ]P*k*]k*k*ühUk:wiH*%i «w&typdLikdi 4l*&#
awKÜHM** @R IklMt *0<), 0<X>***B ]&*;jU;üMWMd&]r hü&d &aM«* <:(NQü*tf*M:iL$dL;
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ip&ii<&h tiw* <:a;*i(j&{* *dr waaa» i»i»a*%t lawadklftataî» Aa ai#***%»(l ]birig*d$* 
a»qr&j[#pMni iLtf» )el3Ml# edF *j|d is;»jüklak*k iLawadkat amd akirti Itaupgr,
tuh&iüBbK* :üM»aWP
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Academy, *** give* the ta$k of b*ild&ag the fortification#.
The geaefal wofked 1* aeeret h##dq*art#f# at Soecho* *lth  
the ae#%#t*ace of Germa* expert*. A p%a* to reofeaale* the 
coaetal 4#fe#*e$, eopeeially along the Vk&gtee River 
(e flg la a lly  defeated by old #***) at Xlaagyl*, Chlaklaag and 
Maeklmg va* actively being paraaed j**t before the eatbreak 
of h o a tllltlea , U&fort**at#ly, the #$* @*f#a* gaa# had come 
too lat#**bafely a fee week* before the Japaaeae attack,
Bqaally ffa ltlea*  va* the effort *& the Ghlaeae coaaterpart 
of the *#lade*b*rg* llae  mhleh eonaleted ef a aeteork of 
plllbexe# aad foftreaaee beteeea the capital and Bhaagbal.
Thl* lia* did aet live *p to It# axpectatloB# vhem the teet 
came, *ad It *e#t the may of the Maglaet, the #legfrled, and 
other aaeh "impregnable line# of defeaae,*#
*##* after the conflict broke eat between Chlaa and 
Japan, the Japan*** ambaeaador in Berlin, Mbahakoji, demanded 
the withdrawal of the German military ml$»l#n and the atopplng 
of ahlpment* of war material* to  China; the Japan*** alao 
wanted moral aapport. At the earn* time, the Chin##* ambaaaador 
preteated to the German ferelga Cffice abwat the aatl«@h#ne#e 
tone of the German pre*#; meat item* abeat th# $*bj*ct were 
appearing mnder a Tokyo rather than a ahaaghal dateline**
5ii»td-, 101.
6#»*. Department of gtmte, U.&. Pereian flelatl^&a. 1937, 
III (Far Eaat) fwaohingtoa,
Printing, 19#9«5l), Gilbert to Secretary of State, A&gaat 26, 
1937, l;83.
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V*a Ntarath r«f*a#d to  comply *&tb t&* J&poao»# demaad 
for moral oapport 1* tho Japaa#»# atraegl# *@ala#t Commwai#* 
in th* r*#l## of G&iaag %mi*$h#k. Th* Gormaa foroiga miaiotor 
to ld  Maahmkojl th a t, i f  Oormany otoppod tb# arm* trad# and 
focaiiod  her advlaor* from China, th# Gorman# woaid tb#a b* 
aiding againat Mkakiag in th* c o n flic t  and *o*id f a i l  to  be 
aentfal toward China a* Adolf H itiar had ordered. Von Nearath 
pointed oat t#  the Jap****# amhaaaador that withdrawal of the 
German m ilitary  miaaion from China woald only reaait in the 
wacaneiea being f i l l e d  by &*#*i*&e, which weald be moat 
andeairable for  Japan* Maahakoji then aaked the German 
Foreign h in ia ter  that the German adviaer* he kept away fro*  
the immediate front» Von Wearath rep lied  that the German 
adrieer# had already bee* given order* to th i*  e ffects?
BOwever, in China the Japane## army general s ta f f  beeame 
iACfea*in9 iy  angry ahoat the active  p articipation  ef German 
m ilitary adviser# in the *#hootia@ war.* The Japaneee army 
aaeerted that the adviser* were engaged la  d irecting the 
f ig h tin g , e sp ec ia lly  ia  section# ef the treaehes aroaad 
Shanghai, It wa* reported to  the ambassador, Dirkeen, 
in Tokyo that a General Streecia* oven meat *o far a* to  
take one ef the Chinese warlord# in  ghaatmag severely to  task  
for hi# slackness in  f e l f i l l i a g  hi* d eties  toward the marshal**
Tweise&eker to  Dirksea, Jely 26, 193?» D.G.F.P. D, 1, 7b3.
8*0* Dirksen, 178»
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Th« #d*%$er* lade#d enjoyed cioee relation* with
th* e&*a$#$ army #ad Ghlma# K*l**hek. General von falk*aha**en 
##* a eloee friend of the marmhal. The advleer* were the plek 
*f the R#*eh#*#hf, and fro* their arrival they had enjoyed the 
re*p#et #f the Chine** leader#, and they went on to eallat their  
cooperation# Generali#»!** China#, e*peolaily captivated by 
Q#r**a efficiency, placed cennlderahle treat la the*# advlaer# 
and nasght t* employ the* la never#! reapectn* to advl#* la  
the tralala* of a n*cle*n force to reel&t the j*p*me$e iav*#lo&f 
Ip advance the moderalnntlon of the prcvimelal *r*le#; throeph 
lacreneed ntreagth la the oatlyln# are*#, to enhance the nalfyln# 
effect of the central goveraneat* nad to halld op an entente 
vhich *e*ld promot# better m ilitary, p o litica l and ladantrial 
relation#*?
&o Ahgaat 21, 1937* the $!*o*$ovlet Pact wae ccneladed. 
fhf# agreeaeat confirmed German fear# that Japan wa* driving 
China into the hand# of the Baealaaa and Belahov*»*. Japan 
claimed that eh* wa# acteally fighting Cemmma!#* In Chlaa and 
that Germany wa# obliged to aid her aader th# Aatl*C@mlntern 
Pact ef 1936* Germany*# reply #a# emphatla; The Aatl*co*lntem  
Pact did not provide for combattl&g Cemmmniam la  the territory  
of third atatea.lO la fact, a# #*l#*&e%*r pointed oat to the 
Japan### ambaaaador, Japan wa# paehlng China toward the commea 
enemy of Germany and Japan,
9p. p. Lin, l6k*2,
lOiki#*, 27*
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8*f*a@ A*08*t #ad $*pte*b#r, 1937# %h# Party 
dl$*@r*#d *it& the Relchawehf, Porelga Office aad Eeeaomica 
M iaiatry *& the eear#* te  take la  the Par E*»t, The Relchewehr 
theaght tha t Japaa eimpty **$ ae t atreag eaeagh te  eeaqaer 
Chiaa, ^ie &A efgaa of the Germaa army geaerai staff*
declared 1* la te  September tha t there *a* #* bael# fo r the 
b e lie f  that J&pam weald f ia a lly  # ia  ia  Chlaa and, compariag 
the iavaaloa ef Chia* with Mapeieoa## campaiga ia  Raeeia# 
predicted th a t th**@h Japan might "aeiae fragment* of te rr ito ry ,*  
Chlaa *oald remain *iayineibl#* and " f i l le d  with irrevereib le 
hatred**!*
The #a*i P a r ty  d id  not agree, Japan *a* conaidered the 
strong  power la  the  Par Ea*t aga inst Bolaheviaau The Nazi* 
were of the opinion th a t  fo r  the  aak* of p o l i t i c a l  a o l id a r l ty  
w ith Japan, German commarcial ia te re a t*  in  China woald have 
to  be abandoned.*2 Thl* meant th a t th a r*  woald be no need fo r
llRoainger, "Par Eastern Policy*, Pacific Affaire, h29*h30»
!2Adj, Gen# Dept,, Trial of the Major War Criminal*, X il, 
(wei**#ck*f), h31#3&, eapials* Hitiert# opinion of Japan#* 
position in the Par Eaat# Hitler pat i*  a directive for the 
Pear Year Plan» 1936, "...preaentiy there are only two nation# 
ia Earop# which caa be regarded a# being firm agaiaat Boleheviem** 
Germany aad Italy , The ather nation# are either disintegrated 
by their domestic way of living, infected by Marxism and there* 
for# designed to  collapse within the discernible fatare, or 
rated by aathoritarian governments, the ealy strength of which 
are the military meama ef power which maams that d*e to the 
necessity of protecting thee#a#temce ef their own leadership 
against their own people by the forcible means ef the execative 
power, they are anabie to a tili» *  these forcible meaeare# 
eatward# for the protection of the nation. Ail these nation* 
weald be enable to wage war against Rwseia with the prospect 
of saccess,
"Generally, beside# Germany and Ita ly , only Japan can be 
considered as a power resisting the world peril».#"
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Germany to have *dvf#er# ia Chin* @ad thmt Germany woaid be 
c*t *ff fr#* her &r$d# male## jopea were eieterle*# ia Chine 
Re* meter*#!# were badly needed by the Germen reermement 
ladaetry» Bat the o ffic ie !  yeper of the *##1 Party, der
claimed that Japaa wa* the champion agaiaet CcmmaBlet activ itie#  
la the far Eaat.*3
At the eatbreak ef fighting between China and Japan,
Genera* won Palkemhaaaen wa# involved with the Chlneae National 
Army etrategy* The general gave, in confidence to Chiang 
Xai*ahek, an optlmiatlc eetlmate of the probable coerae of 
event* in the con flic t. An expert on far Eaetem affa ire, 
he conferred dally with the Chine## marcha! and hi# mtaff, 
and often attended the Chime*# army etaff meeting# at which 
he gave hi* opinion# regarding the tactica l plan# of the 
Chine## army in reaiatlag the Japame## invader*.lb
The dleagreemeat between the Naai Party, which wa* pro* 
Japan###, and the pro*Chiae*e o ffic ia l*  In the German govern* 
meat widened daring the eammer and fa ll  of 1937. A eimilar 
ep lit  in the government wa# growing in Japan. The viewpoint* 
of the japaneee army and the japene#* foreign Office differed 
regarding the "China Problem." Depmty Chi# of Staff Tada and 
hi# able eabofdiAate, Colone* lehahara, a well*kaown #trategi*t 
in military dealing# with &*#»*#, preaaed the government#* demand# 
for an early *ettiement in China, Pinanci*! circle* grew more
I3lkle#, 59,
i%Rew York Time*. Way 20, 1936.
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With th# problem* evta Ferolga Mlalater Hlrota 
W&» in favor of *om# kind of oottlemeat. The Japan*#* Foreign 
Cffic* approached th* B ritiah  ambaaaador aboat mediation *oo& 
a f te r  the co n flic t, bat War Miniater Sagiyoma rejected each 
mediation on the p rincip le  th a t *th#re ahoald be direct 
negotiation* bet**#a Japan and China becaaee of the A aiatlc 
WOnroe Doctrine apan which Japan had been iaaietlog  ever oiaee 
her withdrawal from the Leagae of Ration*,
Cn October 27, 1937, an important change took place ia 
Berlin. Togo wa# appointed amba#$ador to Germany in place of 
Muehakeji, and he wa* i&etracted to par#*# the taak of convincing 
the Germane, particalarly Hitler and van Rlbbentrop, that Japan 
woald certainly **cceed in the cangneat of China and that by 
aapportlng Japan, Germany might aaeare heraelf * preferred 
po*ition in C h in a ,T h e  new Japanese ambassador did not go 
to the German Foreign Office with hi# imetraction*, bat, instead, 
went to see von Ribbeatrop. In the fa l l  of 1937, von Rlbbentrop 
was s t i l l  the "ambassador plenipotentiary" of H itler, and 
German Foreign Minister von Rearath wa* apparently ignorant 
of the talk# between van Rlbbentrop and Togo.17
The Chinese co n flic t embarrassed the German Foreign O ffice. 
Germany had a p o li tic a l a llian ce , the Anti*@o#intern Pact, with 
Japan, and at the same time mhe had important investments, trade
i#Jas«s T. C, Lia, "German Mediation in the Sino*Japane#e 
War, 1937*38", Far Eastern Oaarterlv. Vol. 8, l28.
Mil. Trib. for the Far East. 48,739.
l^As ne have seen in the proceeding chapter, conversation# 

































































































































was becoming more friendly  toward Japan. The Japanese had 
asked the F&hrer t o  r e f u s e  t o  attend the Nine*power Conference, 
meeting at that time In Brnaael# to deal with the China confllct.19  
H itle r had peraonally given order# to  the German foreign mlnlater 
not to  attend the meeting, a move which certa in ly  Increased 
Japan*# respect for him.
Dr. Trautmann pointed out to  the Chinese foreign m inister.
Dr. Wong Chong-hnI, that mediation between China and Japan was 
not as simple a# I t seemed. The SIno*&ovlet Pact concluded In 
August 1937 made a solution to the problem with Japan much more 
d if f ic u l t  for C h i n a . 20 Germany expected that China, In the 
fu ture, would have to  revise her policy toward the Soviet Union 
If peace were to  come to  the Far East. The Chinese foreign 
m inister replied tha t he fu lly  understood the position  of 
China and pointed out th a t i t  was Japan who lad forced the 
Chinese to  a lly  with Russia in the f i r s t  place,
*9 ln t. Mil. TrIb, for the Far East, 632*6, explains that 
a month i a t e r 6ë 6, tnsLsagae of Nations decided
th a t Japan** m ilita ry  operations against China were out of 
proportion with the Incident which had occasioned the con flic t 
and could be ju s tif ie d  neither aader existing treaty righ ts nor 
upon the grounds of se lf  defense.
ZOTrautmann to  Foreign M inister, October 30, 1937, DGFA*
D, 1, 77fi.
3k
Th# conduct of the Japanese army in China took a very 
d i f f e r e n t  t u r n  a f t e r  th e  i n i t i a l  invas ion .  The campaign was 
*0 unsatisfactory tha t even the Japanese army general s ta ff  
abandoned the hope for a speedy v ic tory . On November 
1937, due to  the pressure of German disapproval. Foreign 
Minister Hlrota presented the f i r s t  peace offering. I t wa* 
relayed to the Chinese by the German*.21 The Japanese terms 
were the basis for negotiations.
Dr. Trautmann read the terms to  Chiang Kai~shek in a 
meeting the following day. The Chinese marshal replied that 
he could not possibly accept the Japanese demands as long as 
the Japanese army was not prepared to restore the status quo 
ante; i t  would be possib le to negotiate i f  the Japanese army 
would meet th is  requirement,22 Quite confidently, the marshal 
Informed the German ambassador that the Chinese government 
would be swept out of o ff ic e  by public indignation i f  he agreed 
to  the Japanese demands* apparently, Chlaag had not forgotten  
the Sian kidnapping and the "All China Salvation A ssociation.*  
There would be a revolution, Chiang stated . According to  him, 
the Japanese were pursuing the wrong policy* instead of 
making a friendly gesture toward China now and thereby laying 
the basis for friendship, they were making demands. If the
21 Int. Mil. Trib. for the Far East, k8,66$.
22rrautmann t o  Foreign M in i s t e r ,  November 1937, D. G, 
F. P .. D, I , 780, —
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army coatlnuad the war, China weald not have a chance 
of eventually w inning, but neither would she lay down her  arm*. 
If the Chlneae government were to  f a l l  as a resu lt of the 
Japanese courae of action , the Communla&a would certa in ly  gain 
the upper hand and It would be impossible for Japan to  make 
peace, for the Reds would never cap itu la te .23
Thl* blunt statement loomed over the German policymakers* 
the Foreign Office, the Economics M inistry, and the Relchewehr 
wanted China as an a lly  against Bolshevism* if  the struggle 
continued, Germany would lose an a lly . Chiang could therefore 
hope tha t the Germans would do th e ir  best to  mediate in the 
co n flic t.
Once more the German Foreign Office In Berlin was under 
pressure to remove th e ir  advisees fro* China, The Japanese 
knew well that the German advisers were under unofficial 
private contracts with Chiang Kai-shek, but news dispatches 
were appearing, such as a United Press statement tha t five 
German advisers were in active service in the Shanghai area 
on the Chapel front and that the s ta f f  of advisers had been 
transferred  to Nanking. According to  the Uhlted Press, a 
considerable number of German m ilitary  advisers took part In 
the actual fighting and were in command of Chinese troops.
The re trea t of the Chinese on the northern front In the face 
of a threatening Japanese encirclement had been recommended 
by the German advisers although i t  was against the wishes of
23ibld.
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th* Chinese general s ta f f .  According to  the U.P. report, 
eighty*#evea member# of the German group took p a r t  i n  th is  
operation.2k Then, in the same telegram to B erlin In which 
th is  report *a# given to  the German foreign minister by 
von Dirksen, the German Ambassador in Tokyo reported that 
a re liab le  source from Shanghai had told him that General 
von Palkenhansen had been in Shanghai for a considerable 
time and had led the operations there. In addition, 
according to  von Dirksen, i t  was reported tha t the two other 
German advisers had been on tha t f ro n t,25
The German foreign Ministry sought to  b e l i t t le  the report 
of the advisers* a c tiv it ie s  in China. The next day the German 
foreign minister received a telegram from Dr. Trautmann 
sta ting  that the advisers were not employed at the immediate 
fro n t, th a t no war had been declared in the co n flic t, tha t 
the U .f. report was pure fabrication  and tha t General 
von Falkenhausen had never been on the front. According 
to  Trautmann, General von falkenhausen had been invited
Zkoirksen to Foreign M inister, Sept. 21, 1937, D.G.F.P,.
D, I , 7$9. Apparently the news dispatch of the Unite# Press 
was a grave overestlmation of the number of advisers for F.F. Liu, 
102, report* that in 1933 there were 61 German advisers and 
officers with the Chinese army, 22 of them in key positions, 
in 1932 th is  number had Increased to  70, but In 1938 the 
remaining m ilitary  advisers numbered only 30. Than again,
Mr. Edgar Snow (The B attle for Asia, New York; Random House,
19ki) seems to tFTnF^EKar^EFere^were about a hundred German 
advisers in China at the time of the co n flic t. See Appendix.
2$Dirksen to Foreign, M in i s t e r ,  September 21, 1937, ibid.
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by Mar#h#l Chimag Kmi*#hck*» he*dqo*rter* to  acquaint 
himself with the s itu a tio n  as the other foreign m ilitary  
attaches were doing,26
Because of the p ro fitab le  Chinee* trade, the German 
Foreign Office wa* p a rticu la rly  interested in keeping it* 
advisers with Chiang Kai~*hek. The German foreign Winiater 
suggested th a t, i f  H itler should mention the withdrawn of 
the advisers, von Blomberg, the war m inister, should ask if  
Soviet advisers would be p referab le ,27 Later von Blomberg 
reported that H itle r had not taken up the question but had 
pointed out th a t the War Ministry should fid  i t s e l f  of the 
reputation of having a pro,Chine*e a t t i tu d e .28
On November 28, 1937* Dr, Trautmann called  on Dr. Kung, 
then president of the Executive Yuan a t Hankow, and the next 
day he called again on the Chinese foreign m inister. Dr,
Wong Chong~hui, to  whom he handed a mew se t of Japan#** 
demand* for mediation. The demands had been drawn up before 
the Japanese offensive*
26rrautmann to  Foreign M inister, Sept. 23, 1937, D. G, F. P,
D, I , 761. '
^̂ Memo by Msekensen, Nov. 3, 1937, (bid,, 777» Also, 
according to Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika* Generals and 
Nazis in the T hird  Reich (New yopW* , T f 52"!',
1 iaËDer g # s ^o f i  t  i ca 1 outlook did not mirror the F&hfer** 
but rather embodied old and deep currents of thought common to 
many Junker nobles. Like von Seeckt, he favored a close 
re la tio n  to  Russia, and advocated the eventual p a rtitio n  of 
Poland. He was anti-Japanese and, again like von Seeckt, pro*Chines
^̂ Memo by Maekensen, Nov, 8, 1937, ib id ,, 782.
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1) Iwwr be
2) The **a# I* *#fth Chi*# #h#ll b* extended;
while the Ch*&$#e Ceatr#! 8#vef**e*t # t i l l  fetmla# the 
#d*i*i$tr#tiwe power# ever North Chi*#$ i t  $h#ll not 
nppelnt may #nti*j#pw*##e e ffic l# l#  *# lender# there.
If d#ring the interval ef the negetietiea# there ehonld 
#rl#e # new regime la North Chla#, it  #he#ld be allowed 
to remeihf eltheagh to the preeent j*p#m he# no 
inteatien ef eetmbliehiag each # regime.
3) The demiiit#ri*ed gene in Shengh** ehell likewiee be 
extended end the #dmini#tr#tive power ehell remain the 
emme ## before the war.
The prW»ibitien ef antlwJapaneae ectlv itie#  ahall 
fellow the principle# di»ca##ed between Ambaeaadiof Xawagee 
and foreign Miai#ter Chaag Chan in 1936.
$) China ahall take effective meaaare# agalnat Cemnanlam.
6) China ahall reviae her caatmaa datiea in a favorable 
way,
Tl China.*hall fe l ly  reapect the intereat of foreign power# 
in China,™
With the Chlneae National Army in a deaperate aitaation, Narahal 
Chiang Rai,,ahek accepted the jaM^koae term# on December 3# 1937.
Bat dering the latter mantha of 1937, the war in China 
increaaed ateadily both in acale and intenaity. foreign 
policy atatementa had been made in accordance with the Nwantang 
Ar#y*a plan fer c«mdacting a propaganda campaign to convince 
the world of the lawfalneaa ef Japan'» action* in the far 
Eaat, aimaltaneonaly with the advance into C h in a .30
29jamea T. € . Lin, I60*l6l.
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voa thmt » p$*c* w t̂h the ^paa###
h# th# heat policy for Chiam. Ooaoral voa FmikoahaomoA* 
aho *%<* b#oa ordorod to the battie  of #haB@hal with a aombar 
of ataff offieora, waat to Namkiag by apacial order of the 
#aaafaiia#i*Of and had aaaiatad rapaiariy ia  the aapraa* 
haadqaartara at Vaobaap. $ov#rai high^raakia^ Oarmaa adviaar»^ 
amwmg them Ganaral ttrecciao, aorvad ia aaafidaatial capacity 
ia Ahaatoag wd Shaaai.)^
By aariy Jaaaary 1938# i t  wa# ciaar that tha Japaaaaa 
mihitary no ioagar Waatad paaca with tha Waakiag govornmant 
bat rather it# ovarthroa» Tha Oarmaa# a t i i l  triad to aadiata 
ia tha caafilct# bat after tha Japaaaaa aW»a##ador via  it  ad 
the (&ar*#a Foraiga Miaiatry aad daciarad that a proioagad war 
w#a daagaroa# for mad that the dapaaaaa govaramaat coa$idarad
it  ao iorwgar paaaibia that peace coaid be made with tha regime 
of Chiaag Kai*#hk bat siaataad magotiatiaaa with tha imdividaai 
pravimciai gowaramamt# woaid be triad# the Oarmaa foraiga 
miaiatar ahoaid have kaawa it  wa# amaiaa* to  hope to aattia  
the $ima#japama*a e m f i i c t .^  To tha great diawwy of 
Dr, Traatmaam, who w$# working hard far a aattiamamt, tha 
Japanaaa gevarmmamt changed the term# again an Janaary Ü ,
1938, and now the aaramn ambaaaador in China wired in
33f, F. Lin# 162, ^albeit thair contribatlana have been 
greatly anaggaratad and thair fanctiona miaandaratood,*
3b%kie#, 6^.
1̂ 1
to  Berlin* "ve are ioelng face # ith  the Chlneae
through
On January 13, 1938* the Chlneae mlnlater of foreign 
affair# replied to Dr, Trautnann that, a# the new peace term# 
propoaed %%r Japan were ao general, the Chlneae government 
dealred mare detail In order to reach a definite decl#lon,36 
Von Dlrkaen in Tokyo immediately commanloated the Chlneae 
reply to  Hlrota# The Jap#me*e foreign mlnlater, fearing 
that China might gain the #*^ort of the Brltlah and the 
Americana, retorted angrily that China waa heaten and that 
he m*at have a apeedy reply, He emphaalaed that Japan would 
mat permit the matter to become the aahject of Imtemational 
dfacaaafan or mediation in caae the Oerman atteint at mediation 
fa iled ,37
On Janaary 16, 1938# Japaneaa premier Kanoye made a atatement 
which o ff ic ia lly  and pahlicly ended Japaneae attempt# at 
negatlatlan# The ,hkpane#e army had atarted tha attack once 
more and hoped that Chiang Xal'fahek woald aoan be forced to 
capltalate. A few day* after the "Koaoy# atatement* the 
Japaneae foreign mlnlater annomneddthat the oerman mediation 
effort had failed  and deplored the fact that China *had will#  
fa lly  thrown away thl# laat chance,* the laat chance being 
repreaented a# the December act of Japaneae peace termo.38
32int. Mil, Trib. for the Par Beat. 1^9,21^*6,
36ib$d, ,  h9,2b3. 
37ibid,
38ik%##, 67.
In Oermany, the Relehswehr Involved In the von Blomberg 
#nd vwi Fritecb problem, end In Kerch 1938 RItler eeleed control 
of the Relchewehr. Thle chenge effected the Germen military 
advleere In Chlnel daring the winter and eprlng monthe of 1938 
It we* remored that they woald he recalled now tlmt médiation 
had fa iled . There wa* aleo a change In the German foreign Office 
In the beginning of Fehraary 1936: vmn RlhbAtrop wa* appointed 
a* foreign mlaleter by Hitler* Germany'# cordial relation* 
with C^In#, which had eiarvlved for *o long, began to  weaken 
hecaaee Hitler conaolldatod hi* power.
In a epeech on Febroary 20, 1936$ Hitler annoanced his 
Intention to rec##al*e the state ef Kancharla* Although he 
ea^haaleed the neutrality of Germany In the SIno-Japaneae 
cen fllc t, he went on to  #ay#
% believe that a Japaneae defeat la the far Eaat 
wonld never be #f any good to laropo or Anarloa bat 
weald eaclaelvely benefit BolmhevisL govlet Rnaal#
* . * Germany w ill alway# conalder and valae Japan 
a* an element of $ecarfty In It# stand against 
Cememnlmm* Beeaaae for a* there I* not the *lightest 
doabt that even the greatest Japanese v ie tw y  woald 
net In the sligh test degree dadanger the caltare of 
the "White Race* , . ,3?
Hew that Oshlma and Togo had wen their roand with the 
Pdhrer, the me tarn 1 break between Germany and China wa* not 
far away* The Japanese diplomat* were well acqnalnted with 
the feeling* of the German Reichschancellor and his new 
foreign minister concerning the Par East, and had smcceeded
39Toynbee, 570*
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fof the tlm# in getting Oermmn wppert far th#
J*p#n**e pelicie#* In F#bp*»ry 1938, having liatanad to  
tha offOf# ffo# Togo and Oahiwa of pr#f*f#ntial traataant 
fo f Oamwrny Im China, the Mihfaf focogniaad tha Japanaoe 
papÿ*t#atata of laaacharia* It woaid he a meeh better 
arrangement than the had enjoyed e ith  Ghiang Kai**ehek,
or at leaet, thia i# ebrnt the Waeie *ere led to believe,
Not an til April 1938 did the Chimeae ambaaaador ia Berlin 
aak WeieaBcker, the Oermaa aaderaecretary of the Fore 10%
Office, mboat the aevapaper report# from oreat Britaia,
France mad Ceecheaievakia, that tha German military adviaera
had been given ordera to  leave Chlaa, The Germaa amderaecretary
I
told the (^laeae ambaamadert i
, , , , after a l l ,  ## fe lt  that me eaated to maiiatala 
a aeotfai attitade la the 81ao*Akpmae#e war, and in 
the long rea i t  waa iacemaiateat with thia attltad#  
i f ,  aa a reamlt of the preaeace and a»ai*t«%ce of 
aome thirty former German officer#, the world ahomld 
believe, rightly or wremgly, that we were actively  
imclnencij^ the Chlneae cemdact of the iear,40
The Chinee# amhaaeader atreaeed that thia order womld create
mach harm for Germamy and hoped that It waa not a direct order^
Weiaahcker replied that it  waa net a military order aince the
^ ficera  were no ieager in German military aervice bat it  wa#
the wiah of the German gevernmeht,41
*̂4ieme by Wei##mcker, April 27, 1938, D*G,F.F.. D, I, 8 # .
4lib id ,
Togo h&d *#k#d v@a Ribbentrap 
ab»»t th* po**f# @f th* G*r#»A g*v$fRm*At w*r It* citieeA*.
V*A Rjbb*Atf@p had »t»t*d that 0*r#*zy had pawar *v*r her 
eitiaea# ev*r$*a$ b*t that th**# advl#*f$ #*r* aadar Chla*** 
cemtracta*^
Oa May 2S, 1938, Dr* fraakmaaa rataraed ta Hankow aad 
@av* a *t*t*#ant to th# pf#o# to th# affect that th# Qermaa 
gav#ram*at had axpraaaad a deaIr# to th# Chtaaa# govaramaat 
that tha advlaar# ba allowed to caaaal thair contract# and 
ratarn to aarmaoy* Thl# reqaaat wa# motivated by the 
conaldaratlon of naatrallty la the coafllot* Von Falkanhaaoan 
*a# reported to b# agalnat th# removal or recall of the 
advlaar# and wlahad to remain aa gaaat of Chiang Kal*ah#k.*^3
When Dr̂  Traatmann notified von falkenhaaaen of Hitler*# 
withdrawal of the Oerwrn military miaaionf the ùerman general 
wrote in proteat to the Qerman foreign mlnlater. Von Falkenhauaen 
atated that th# private contracta ran ant11 1939 and 1940 and 
con Id not be terminated ani laterally . Thia woald mean a breach 
of contract and legal lia b ilit ie a  for damage#, lea# of money for 
the ret%&m Joamey and compenaation for the interve##(gg period.
4^"Wili Japan Abandon the Axia?" from the China Weekly 
Review, gWmghai Bngliah#langwage weekly, Lfvi#^
{ÂTÿ 1939), 472, atate# *^,,.it mnat be fea*&&ared, beaidea, 
that Qeneral van falkemhaaaen, head of th# Oermm adviaer#, 
wa* generally credited with having contribated to the 
victoriiMÉ# omtceme of the battle of Taierhehwang for Chinai** 
thia battle wa# one in which the Japaneae were eoandly beaten.
43Dep#rtment of d ta te , U.&. Foreian Relatione. 1938. I l l  
(Par E as t) ,  John#on to Secr@llry‘*W ^I*îe7n^r2S7^^5fr 182.
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Fof the m&jorfty of the advleer», termiomtiaa of these contr*ct* 
would me&a giving up their vocetlw e ehd we#ld c*u*e their 
fInane1#1 ruin elnee meet of them could be offered no equivalent 
poeltloA et heme* Thl* we# particularly tree ef edvleer# whoee 
reinstatement in the Wehrmacht wa* Impoaelhle* Because of the 
Increased expenditure# caused by the war, a number of adviser# 
had contracted financial obligations* If they broke their 
contracts, they would be stranded In Chlaa and in debt.44 
Almost a ll  of the adviser* had their ho#ms and most of 
their property In banking and continued to  keep their domestic 
help there a* the safeguarding of property net already plundered 
by the Japanese could not be guaranteed by the government of 
Chiang %I*shek* Leaving China would entail the loss of many 
possessions, jU%>osslble to ship. The woman secretaries In 
the Central Adviser** office had come to China at their own 
expense and would not have money for the retam journey er 
prospect of employment. The Oerman govemmeat would have t*  
assume the cost of the return Journey for the advisers, their 
fam ilies and their secretaries, compensation for household 
effects , and other damages resulting from th# termination of 
the GontractsJ42
The adviser* were In an awkward position* refusal to 
return to Germany on Hitler** order would be high treason.
44rr&utmann to Foreign Minister, Aer. 30, 1938, D.G.F.F, 
D, I, 8^7. -----------
42ibid.
lj.6
High In Germany wm* punishable by deprivation of
citla*A#blp and coaflacation of personal property and possibly 
other penaltle*. The German government demanded that the 
advleer# abrogate their contract# and promised favorable 
treatment and reemployment in Germany. The orderwdpplled to 
a ll military advl$er#.b6
The German adviser# then received the "aeaaranee* of von 
Rlbbentrop that their withdrawal from China *a* most important 
and that Germany would compensate for their loaaee, Chlang 
%al»#hek hesitated to le t them go, for he feared that the 
German* who were familiar with the Chine## defen### on the 
Hankow and Yangt** River* would Inform the Japan*## of the*# 
fortification*, When the Chinese ambasaador told von Rlbbentrop 
of hi# fears, the German foreign minister rejected the charge 
angrily and implied that his sense of honor had been violated. 
'VOn Rlbbentrop was tired of the Chine## haggling and put a 
time limit on the recall of the advisers. #e informed 
Dr. Trautmann that i f  the advisers had net le ft  before 
June 2̂  ̂ 1938, Germany would break off diplomatic relations 
with the ChineseJb? Dr. Trautmann then le ft  for Germany. A 
few day# later the Chine## marshal released the German# who 
had been on hi# sta ff since 1927.
Nor were the German officer# without criticism , Frieda 
Utley wrote of the German adviser* role in the Chinese conflict)
bGjohnson to Secretary of State, June 23, 1938, U.&, For,
*al. 1938. I l l ,  202. ^
kYRibbentrop to Traatmana, June 1938, D.G.F.P., D, I, 883,
k7
#the*r theory of 6 Hlndenbarg Itae for fortification* which 
could not be broken was amelea* in »o vast a country a# China. 
They were good d r ill sergeant*, but thl$ 1* not what we wanted 
and their conception* and tactic* were unmultable in China.*4#
The German adviser* also cr itic ised  the Chine** army** 
conduct of the conflict, continually objecting to th* commit* 
ment of troop* In fu tile  defenses. The chief adviser, in one 
of hi* confidential report* to the Generalissimo, while 
praising the stand of the Chinese force* at &h&nghal*~and 
indeed the crack units of the Central Army fighting there 
owed their efficiency to German supervised and trained 
troops**could not refrain from Implying that, in th* face of 
undeniable superiority In enemy firepower, the tenacious 
defense of the fixed positions had been 111 advised. Von 
Paikenhaueen hinted that excessive sacrifice would cost China 
her main striking power and be detrimental to  her long»term 
military interest*. The German adviser# were completely at 
variance with the Chinese concept# * life  and die in defense*. 
Résolut# defease of walled c i t ie s ,  particularly Nanking and 
Taiyuan, drew sharp German criticism  and advice to rely 
instead on highly trained, mobile striking force* with 
swift and calculated attacks.49
The German adviser# net only cr itic ised  Japan** fight 
against Commuai»* la China but alao the Japanese army strategy.
4#prieda Utley, China at #ar (New York* John Day Co., 
1939), 8 . '  -----------------
49p. F, Liu, 163.
48
*fmy d*d not otrlke with overwhelming force*, hot 
tried to fine** e cheep conqeeet la the summer of 1937,
Enough men hed been eeat to Chine for e breakthrough, but 
not enough to round up end annihilate th* Chin*#* erml*#, 
which evaded encirclement. Th# conaequencea of the original 
miatake# multiplied in geometrical progreaaion# each time 
reinforcement# were brought in, the problem had already 
grown beyond proportion* that coaid be h a n d le d ,T h e  
Japanese had a million men in China, enough to maintain a 
stalemate.
In July 1938, just after the German military adviser* 
le ft  China, General Arika said "Japan*# determination to 
&ght to a fin ish  with China and Russia is su fficien t to carry 
it  an for more than a decade,*#* Th# Japan#** army was 
certain of a victory in China*
#Oowea Lattlmore, "Stalemate in China*, Foreli 
XIX (April 1940) ,  624,
S iln t, Mil, Trib. for the Far Eaat, li8,7<%?.
CHAPTER » 1  
miR TRADE wrm cm m
Th* fo f th* of th$ Gefm*
m$Ut*ry in China probably infiaonead th* o#fm»n
Amtiwal A##oci»tl0R of M#w*fmet*r#r# (R#i«h#v#rb#Ad dor 
D*mt#ch*a W aatfia) ahWh #*Kt # #p*@i»i $oa%#«#« 
to China in 1 9 3 0 Whil# thi$ mlmalon #dv#e$tad eio$#r $%no# 
<Wr#an trada relation#^ i t  wa# di#tpa$#ad by th# aaaettled T 
#t*t# of affair# in ChW* In It# mpoft# Oanwi iny##tm*nt 
in China #a# r#caa*#nd#d only thraagh th* *#t#hli#h*#nt of 
&iM». #̂rm#n antarpri**#. Tber# war* a# praatiami reaait# 
f*ilawia@ th* #i#$iWf $in** th* o#f%ma #*ia»r gavammant 
wa* oppaaad to gaarantaeing loan# *xt*nd*d by Oarwan haain*## 
t* h*#*v*r# oat of thi* *voiv#d $h* China
Stadian a*##Uahaft (#*#i*ty f«w China gtadi**)# a r#pr###nt* 
ativ# organ *f th* Carman bamlnaa# int*r*»t$ in China.
Th* China Stadiam Qaaaliahaft gr*w into a **#^p#tant 
organ ta advia* German merehamt* am ginaxiarmam trad*.
China* im apita ef her pra*e*r#mn ayN^thia## har maad far 
dawaiapmant thraagh faraigm eapitai# and th* pragraaaiv# 
camaaiidatian af th# matiwai gavarzmamt and it* fiaamcial
^Biach, %7.
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VùR Seeokt cmme to  Chia» ## mUltmry »dvl»er to  
Chlamg %»I»#h*k with of the R#ich#w#hr and EeoAoalG#
WiAi»tri»». Part of von s#oekt*$ fm ctfon  #»» to  hniW »p the 
$imo»'Q»r#»n trade and to davoiop Chim*# indaatria l power.
Von Seackt regarded the haiWing of a modem Chlneae arey to  
be ie^aaaibi# «ni#»» aeeoapanied by fndaatrial fee<m»traction. 
The Chine»» nation had to  roorganiae it»  eoenomy and »et ap 
an arnanent tndnatry (Ra»tanp*inda#trie) with German teohnicai 
and m aterial aeaiatanoe*^
Thia «pinion concerning the Chine»» armament imdaetry 
warn perhap# infiaenoed by the faot th a t on him f i r a t  v ie i t  to  
China von $»eckt wae met by Major Prea in ^onkong.(Major Prea 
had accompanied him on the t r ip  from oermany to  Manking). Prea 
had gone on to  Canton and had been joined by Barton Klein who 
had arrived from Oermanyi they had a tarted  aecret negotiatiohe 
with the Canteneae aathoritie»* On Aagaat i# 1933, Klein 
informed Traatmann of a eontraot for the bailding of an 
armament indaatry near Canton.?
Soon, Kiein aeked a gaarantee of the Weimar government.
Me eoaid not back th ia  contract and therefore aaked if  the 
German government eoaid aponaor each an inveatment. The 
"Klein P ro ject,"  aa i t  waamiled by the Germon bmaaracracy, 
waa diacaaaed a t  an interdeÿmrtrnental ecmference. Major 
General von Reichemaa #9^ha»i*ed th a t for the Reichawehr
P. Lia, 97.
^Traatmann to  Pore ion Mini$ter, Sept. 18, 1933, D. G.
P. P . , c , I ,  812.
WtA&mtfy th *  o f th e  "K lelA  y ro je c t^  #%»
' \
p#MUMMWt. The p ro^m etive eepecK ty o f th e  *r**me%^ ia d u p tr^  
0#MMway #ho#%d he e tre h g th eh e d  #$&%&# of oM er«| 
f r o *  eh to ed  #o t h a t  f t  woaW he mvai&»h%$ *he» weeded; a t
p f e e e a t ,  th *  aym m eht W a e t f y  **# a o t * * ff  l e i e a t l y  eepioyed^\
by d e m e e tk  o fd e f* ,^  I t  *#» #1** dec ided  a t  t h l e  coR f*fe«c#\
t h a t  th *  f a t  e re  c o a re e  of th e  "*KIeln Projeot** depended apon \
von  $eeek t*$  R *g*tt* tIow » v l t h  Chlang %*l*#hek end th a t  Chlah|;*$
c e n a e a t ah e a ld  av o id  am higalty*?  A t f l r a t  th e  m arabel f*d   ̂ \
pef%t»ed th e  **Klel& P ro je c t"  f o r  I t  ea*  e lgned  by th e  Imdlv
Chine#* g overno r# , h a t  l a t e r  he a c c e p te d , moat l ik e ly  becaaa*
o f th e  In f la e a c e  o f Q eaera l von $ e* ck t,
th e  Relchaw ehr no l# a g e r  o b je c te d  to  e a ta b l la h ln g  an
arm aw m t la d a a t ry  n e a r  can toa*  C olonel T hom #, th e  head
o f  th e  #*f#an  A m y Ordnance o f f i c e  e a ld  th a t*
« * t i n  v ie #  e f  th e  n M en t n e c e a a ity  of aap p lem n tln G  
th e  aroy*» raw m t e r l a l  re q u 1rmment# th e  R eichevehr and 
th e  p re s id e n t  # f  th e  R elchshank , Dr, S ehach t, had in  
p r in c ip le  approved "K lein*#  P r o je c t ,"  e a p e c la l ly  a#
#e d id  n o t need t #  m k e  any fo re ig n  a a rre n c y  a v a ila b le *
The r l a k  ae em d  ##%II a ln c e  #* ah o a ld  ha making 
m achinery m vm llahl* m arl naaan  v l t h  th e  d e l iv e ry  
o f  area*  K le in  had a* r a r  jm at i f  led  th e  a m fld e n e e  
p la ced  In  him# # # .
t a t e r  th e  Chine## # In  th e  ea ta b llah m en t o f a  kma*fanÈ
\
\.
(national defenae Indnatry) dealt largely v lth  the Oermn 
4*emo by Kahlborn, Feb. 16, D.G.F.P., C, II, 49$,
lOwemo by Erdmannadorff, Feb. 14. 1935, D.G.F.F.. C. III.
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Indamtrl&l R#pro, *nder OSrlng^ and #et ap a
imtiemal yaaearce# plaanlao cogmiaaltm andar tha milltary 
coancil.
Also» the big Iron and atael firm of Otto Wolf (Cologne}j, 
which had early met op an office in thanghai ,̂ made tremeiidoaa 
profit* contracting for railroad# with Chian# Kal*ah#k. In 
193!;̂ a loan of 16 million Chine## dollar* for the 300 ka, 
Yushan̂ &Hanching aeotloa of the Chekain$*Kiang#i n&ilway wa* 
made; in 1936 another loan of 20 #11lion Chlneae dollar# for 
th# 200 km, extenaion fro# ihmching to Pinghalangi and late 
in the a&me year* a third of 30 million chin### dollar# 
of which 20 million wa# to he need for a 1#000 km. railway fro# 
Chakow to Rweiyang and 10 million for a p#iping«diankow railway 
bridge acroa# th# Yellow River
With war a# well a# peace In mind, highway# and raileay# 
were #^edily hmiit. factorie# aprang ap. Ar»#nal# were 
expanded and moderniaed* The new indaatry wa# geared to the 
feveri#h military preparationa# diving hi# military chief, 
General von Falkenhaaaen, a free hand in military matter#, the 
ailing von Seeckt maater^minded China## Imdaatrial expanmixm. 
Hi# overall plan# for reconatrmetlxm of the Chineee army and
F. tia , p. 97.
*^%o#inger, ^Germany*# Far % #tem  Policy ander Hitler^# 
1*21̂ 1:22, when the new Japan*## in v a a i^  in 1937, the
Ya#han#%ankiAg line had been completed and the line from 
Ranching to  Plnghaiang wa# %mder #on#tractixm, hat work on 
the Chakow*Rweiyang road had not yet began.
kread general atfatagi*» w»ra l«p*rt*at, Wt hi# 
moat migaif leant work #*$ cone#m#d with the #$tmbli#h*ent 
of the Chine## war indagtrie# and the eneearagement of the 
Sino*0#fman trade#*)
The German# were well aware of China*# haokwardnee# 
fndaetrially and made every effort to adviae them on the 
expamaion and acceieratim  of the manitian# indaetrie*.
Ihider Chineee direction the araenai# at Ranking* Rung*heienf 
ead Bengyang prodaoed weapon# of original German deaign* enoh 
a# the Maxim machine gun* the 82 mm. trench mortar and the 
Maaaer r if ie  and pietel* The atandard Chineee rifle*  the 
Chang Cheng or "Generaliaeimo Chiang model** wa# aotaaily a 
wamaer deaign. For the f lr e t  time* chiefly due to mchtnery 
and toele imported from Germany* Chlneaewmade weapon# embodied 
quality and precieion* Chemical plant# for the manition# 
program were conatraoted with tecbnioal advice frtm I. G*
Parben. With Qerman financing* the Chlneae projected a 
modem ateel mill to  he erected at Chakow, in Hanan province 
When von &#eckt retamed to Germany* leaving von 
Palkenhaaeen In cl#rge of the military #ii»#im* he recomaended 
to Hitler* in the preaence of Blomherg* von Kearath and Schmcht* 
that there wa# a need for parealng a clear^ at German foreign 
policy with reepect to Chlim* Von teeckt wa# for #### time
Up. p. ua* 97^8.
^̂ Ibid. .  101.
the igq»re»*lon that H it le r  agreed w ith  h ie  req aeet,
A barter agreement liiv e lv lh g  100 m lll le n  mark* la  trade  
wa* eigaed  by Ghlaa and (Germany on J a ly  25 , 1936* Taageten  
headed the H a t e f  the Chlaeae raw m aterial*  exchaaged fa r  
Oermaa*made m aaitleae and other la d a a tr la l p rad acta .l^  F ie ld  
Marehal van Blwuberg Imd eendacted the a e g o t la t ie a * !  van Beeekt# 
a* rea ld ea t adviaer to  China la  Crermaay, f la y ed  aa important 
r a le  la  the d e a l, and General von Reioheaaa had m de a aped la  1 
t r ip  to  China a* H itler» *  a p ec la l rep rea en ta tlv e .
Then in  Nevember 1936 the Anti^Comintern Pact wae aigned  
between Qermany and Japan* The Pact wa* alg^ed w lth eat the  
knewledge o f the Foreign O ff ic e , the Ecenemic* M ini»try, er 
the Reichawehf N i n i e t r y , T h e  on ly  concrete r e # u lt  o f  th*  
Id eo lo g ica l partnersh ip  wae an Increaee in trade re la tio n #  
between Germany and Kancharia,
l^Ihldè, 98*
^^Taynbee, 572$ The two government* aigned a trade agree*  
ment whereby Germany nndertoek to  bay anneal%y 100,000,000 yaan*» 
warth o f Naneharian prodace in  r e ta m  fo r  the iixq^ortation of 
German commoditie* to  the v a la e  o f  25 ,000 ,000  yoan. The agree*  
ment, o r ig in a l ly  fo r  on* y ea r , wa* extended #n 1937» September 
l!4,, 1938, a fa rth er  agreement la a tin g  t i l l  May 1 ^ 0  wa# c o w  laded  
in  Maingking, ty  which the two eo a a tr ie» , over and above th e  
trade provided fo r  in the 1936 agreem ent, were to  condact a 
balanced exchange o f  good# to  the va lae  #f !*5,000,000 Aeichamark* 
or 63 ,000 ,000  yaan* Germany the# pledged h e r a e if  t o  & t o t a l  of 
a w a a i parch#*#* o f 163,000,000 yaana# worth of Mancharian good* 
to  the va in #  o f 8 8 ,< ^ ,0 0 0  yaan, Althoagh the balance #%# *o 
a tro n g iy  in  Manehturfa*# fa v o r , Germany fa r th e r  agreed to  advance 
np to  10 ,000 ,000  Reichamark* to  the Bank o f Mancharia in  order 
t o  a a e ia t  in  fin an cin g  th* imparte o f  German merchandlae.
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When the North China Incident of July 1937 developed Into 
a m#jor war, Germany found hereelf (n the uncomfortable poaltlon 
of being friendly  with both warring partie» . While, In the 
beginning, the German preaa was apparently Instructed to be 
friendly toward Japan, It soon turned to n eu tra lity  because 
the conflic t was not popular In Germany; despite H it le r 's  
speeches there were many Germans who were pro*Chlnese,^7 Alao# 
the Chinese ambassador had complained that the news release# on 
the conflic t were datelined Tokyo Instead of Shanghai.
The aid In war materials which China received from the 
Germans was extensive; I t is estlSAted that u n ti l  the decision 
to cease munitions shipments In the spring of 1938, Gernmu%r 
supplied the largest percentage of a l l  asmlstance coming Into 
C h i n a , M o s t  of the munitions were sent by way of the Lloyd 
f le e t  to Hong Kong, but a portion was consigned through the 
te r r i to ry  of Germany's alleged enemy, the Soviet Union.^9
Soon a f te r  the conflic t broke out. H itler pointed out 
that he adhered In principle to the Idea of cooperating with 
Japan, but th a t ,  In the present conflic t between China and 
Japan, Germany must remain neutral. As for the deliveries of 
are» to be wide pursuant to  the agreement with China, these 
should be continued insofar a# China paid for them in foreign 
exchange or by deliveries of raw materials, camouflaged as
178 loch, 37.
l8Wek to  Sec, of State. July 20, 1937, U.S. For. Rel,. 
19:^7, I I I ,  214.
19BUSS, 389,
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much %# po$Blble. Further Chine*e orders should* If possible* 
not be a c c e p t e d . 20 put (lermsny had too many investments in 
Chins for the d rastic  step of breaking re la tions with Chlang 
Ksl^ ŝhek,
Germany*s trade with China ranked th ird  a f te r  Japan and 
the United s ta te s ;  th is  gave her a material in terest in 
preserving the status quo. Eden declared that when Xung was 
in London* the la t te r  had to ld  him of a conversation with 
H itler in which the Führer had referred to  the volume and 
value of the Qerman trade with China and Cermany^s In terest 
in avoiding h o s t i l i t i e s  in North China,
The war profiteers also saw th e ir  chance. Klein of Berlin 
and several german firms in Shanghai were busy dispatching 
fre ighters laden to  fu l l  capacity with war materials to  Hong 
Kong. The Japanese officers harbored the b i t te r  feeling in 
the ir  phrase for the Sins*Japanese conflic ti "The German W a r , "22 
M ilitary supplies continued to pour into China from Oermmny a i l  
through the f a l l  of 1937 and wihher of 1938* these supplies 
were expedited by "proChinese" o fficers  such as War Minister 
Blomberg. According to  von Dirksen, then ambassador In Tokyo* 
the German general s ta f f  became Increasingly favorable to the
20Memo by von Neurath* Aug, 27* 1937* D.O.F.F.. D* I* 7^0.
2%iaghmm to Sec. of State# July 28* 1937* U,S, For. n#*.* 
1937* i l l*  287.
Dirksen* 179.
$8
Chineee end viewed Hitler*# etetement# on e Berlln«Tokyo 
celleh oretfen  with greet re#ervetl<m#.^^
The Jepeneme were proteetlng beth in B erlin  end Tokyo eboet 
Germmny*# condect In the c o n flic t  end the Oeremn Foreign O ffice  
we# under great preeeere. The Qerman foreign mlnleter f in a lly  
Informed the Japaneee ambaeaédor that Qeremn delfverle#  of 
war material had not been made and were not being made to  
China in any conalderable qaantltie#» The Japaneee coaid not 
reproach the Germane, wrote the German foreign mlnleter to  von 
Dlrkeen In Tolqyo, for ee llfn g  lim ited qaantltle#  of arm# to  the 
Chine##* Thla wa# done on a purely commercial ba#i#» Germany 
readily demonstrated her new weapon# to  the Japanese and granted 
extensive Inspection p riv ilege#  to  the Japan### commission. It 
wa# not Germany*# fau lt i f  the Japanese refrained fr%i placing 
order#) the Germane only regretted the fa c t . D eliverlee of arm* 
to China could not be made the auhgeet of German*Japane#e 
negotiation#. But, since the a ltw itlon  wa* approaching a s ta te  
of war, the d e liver ies  of arm# would cease In view of the German 
neutral a t t i tu d e ,^
Germany*# p o lit ic a l a l ly ,  Japan, was driving Germany*# good 
customer Into the arms of the common enemy of the )lntl*Comlntern 
Pact countries, the U.G.S.R., and at the same time demolishing 
the carefu lly  b u ilt structure of German trade in North China,
^*%et»îSeker to von Dirksen, July 28, 193?, D.G.K.P., D 
I, 7W.
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At firm t, German trade loe*e$ were compensated by a boom in 
the arms trade with Chlang Kai»'#hek in Soath China, a provoking 
sftnation for Japan. In a few weeks the war wiped out moat of
the gains the German merchants had carefu lly  made during the
two previous decades. These merchanta lost milliona in 
contracts with the Chinese government when Japan had establiahed 
her policy of monopolisation of trade and resources. As Edgar 
Snow, an American correspondent# pointed out on his v is i t  
to  China, ^ninety per cent of the German businessmen were 
actually  hostile  to H it le r 's  Far Eastern po lic ies .
Just a f te r  the conflic t in September 1937# when Japan 
saw that she could not gain anything by protesting to  the 
German Foreign Office or to H itle r ,  General Oshima want to 
see von Rlbbentrop once more and mentioned a p r^ o sa l  fo r an 
early agreement on a Joint program for Germany with Japan and 
C h i n a ,S t o p p i n g  the trade and recalling the adviser# were 
required for such an agreement.
In October 1937# a directive wa# issued to stop a l l
deliveries of arm# to China, but, on October 20, Colonel
General OBring called on Colonel Thoma# of the Ordnance 
Office and told him that a f te r  again getting in touch with 
von Rlbbentrop i t  was decided to continue buslneaa with 
China in it#  present form. Field Marshal von Blomberg, in a 
le t te r  to  General GBring, ex p lic it ly  stated that he, Blomberg,
106.
^^Ribbentrop to P&hrer, Sept. 19, 1937, D.G.F.P.. D, I , 7^8,
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had given the order ta  the Army Office to continue businea# 
with China in the camouflaged form used up to that time.
General GBrlng showed the German foreign mlnimter the le t te r  
and observed that the 2,000,000 dollar c red it would no* be 
fu lly  u tl lieed . The merchandise was being delivered to a 
B ritish  firm in Singapore on rhknieh ship# and the participant# 
were enJ*gWsd to s t r i c t  aecrecy.27
The F^hrer had a good bargaining point to force the 
Japan»## to  make a favorable agreement pertaining to  China. 
Italy*# inquiry concerning H it le r 's  readine## to comply with 
the Japanese desire for recognition of Manchuria wa# answered 
by the FEhrer In a note to the German foreign minister. The 
foreign minister was asked to  inform the I ta l ia n  ambassador 
that while the Germans were prepared in principle to recognize 
Manchuria, Germany had to re fra in  from setting  a date. Also, 
Germany would require of the Japanese certa in  guarantee# fo r 
Germany's trade not only with lAmchuria but with any other 
Chinese area# Japan might occt$iy a# well, Cai the other hand, 
Germany would have no objection i f  I ta ly , on the basis of the 
declarations exchanged with Japan on the occasion of recognition 
by Ita ly , independently recognised Manchurla.^^
During the la t te r  ha lf  of 1937, although the Japanese 
foreign minister Nsd attempted to gain German support for 
the conquest of China, representing that conflic t a# a struggle
27Memo by Heyden#Lynach, Oct. 22, 1937, D.G.F.P., D, I , 772, 
28mcKen#en to  I ta l ian  Embassy, Nev. 27, 1937, ib id .,  786,
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a g a in s t  CommunIsm, German d isa p p ro v a l of Jap®n»s a c t i v i t i e s  In 
China remained undlmlnlshed, Germany had Important Intereata 
In China and the Relchswehr also considered the Kuomlntang 
as a potential a l ly  against the Soviet Union, Germany elected 
to Ignore the existence of h o s t i l i t i e s  and to regard herself 
as not bound by the rules of s t r i c t  neu tra lity  since neither 
China nor Japan hed declared w ar .^
On. his t r ip  to Berlin, Ambassador von Dirksen mentioned 
that* *̂ on the river, the majority of the Chinese barges and 
junks were flying German, and also B ritish  coiors^^an 
astonishing sight which could only be explained by the 
fact that a f te r  the conquest of the c ity  (Shanghai) by the 
Japanese, the Chinese colors had to disappear,
Although thethllvery of German supplies to  China was 
kept secret, the Japanese foreign minister, Hirota, claimed 
on February 1̂ , 1938, that German arms were somehow finding 
th e ir  way into the enemy*s te r r i to ry ,31 After the f a l l  of 
Shanghai and Canton, German supplies were arriving by way of 
Siberia and the French Haiphon^Kunming railway*
Soon a f te r  the outbreak of the conflic t between China and 
Japan, Klrota realized that Japan was dependent upon Great 
B ritain  and the United States for assistance in the economic 
development of C hina,^  To get Germany out of China or away
29in t .  Mil. Tfib, for the Far East, b.8,662*3.
30von Dirksen, l82,
3 ̂ Toynbee, ]^70.
32In t. Mil. Trib* for the Far East. 1^8,738,
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from the C hinese National Government, was th e  Japanese govern» 
mentis goal. The only way to  do th is  would be to make Germany a 
partner on the Japaneee aide, or to pretend to be w illin g  to  
make favorable trade conceeaione to  Germany in case of a 
Japaneee v ictory  in China. Hirota did not mean to offer  
Germany more than a enggeetion of a apeeial advantage.
Hirota fmd c loaely  circamacribed the lim ite wjlthin which 
Togo, the Japaneee amhaeeador in B erlin , might make promise# 
to the Germane, He intended to  obtain from Germany the aupplie#k
and technical aasietance which were so badly needed by the
1
Japanese army in China, Perhaps he went ^oo far with von 
Rlbbentrop by proposing that, in return fier German recognition  
of Japan's apecial position  in East Asia,'where p ossib le , Ger«%n 
in terests would be preferred to  thoae of ^ther powers. In 
p rin cip le , Germany and Japan would occupy equal poaition in 
the Chineee market**although, in certain  rmapects, a special 
p osition  might accrue to Japan as the powe  ̂ responsible for 
the maintenance of the Chinese currency system. Nevertheless, 
in settin g  up any import or export control system, Germany's 
in terests  would certa in ly  be preferred to  t$ose of any third
pow er.34
perhaps von Rlbbentrop had misunderstood Togo; in any 
case , the German ambassador was plpylng into!H irota'# hands
^^Ib id ,, 48, 662. 3.
34lbid.. 48,676#^?.
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when he to ld  Oshima that Japan and Germany should collal^brate 
more c lo se ly . Itajor General Oshlma passed th is  lnformat,ion on
to the Japanese general s ta ff  which agreed on the propolsal
j
in principle provided that the U.&.S.R, was made the prjimary 
object of the new a l l i a n c e . '
In another conversation between von Rlbbentrop and.
Togo, the German ambassador acquainted the Japanese ambassador1 \
in general terms with the four points which were to  form the
! . 'basis for a confidentia l exchange of notes between the!gpvern#
ments. The Japanese ambassador must have realized  thâ t he had
^ i  !
offered too much; h is government was now opposed to  the plan 
for German parity with Japan, since i f  thS most*favored*r^tion 
clause wae later agreed upon, a l l  other countries couljlli demand
th is  same parity .^^ \
; ' \
The Japanese hint about a c loser  a llian ce  brought, von
> :ft tRibbentf^*» reply thmtCGermany could understand the jWpanê Â̂  
views pertaining to China and was prepared to consider any 
m ilitary and other special in terests  of Japàn In Chin îpe 
terr ito ry . But Germany Insisted on a certain  measure |0 f  
equality  with Japan and a privileged  position  over other 
countries because hf the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936.
^^Ibid. ,  j
36pibbentrop to  Togo, April 8 , 1938, P.O.P.P. , D, I, 
^7lbid,
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Hither'» ##»rch for & clooor olUanco with Japanm# duo 
to th$ fact that the coafHct hotwoen Japan and China wa# 
going badiy for Chiang Kai*ahak. In th# #arly part of 1938$ 
th# Japan##* ari#y$ anr* of it# victory in China$ had r#n#w#d 
it#  attack and th* Chin### ar#y waa gradually withdrawing#38 
In hi# #p#*ch of Fobrnary 20$ 1938$ Hitlor annonncad that 
a*rmany would #**k cloaor relation# with h#r ally$ th* 
Japan##* nation* In th# meantin# von Rihhentrop had become 
th# foreign mlniater in Qermany and Hitler had conaolidated 
hi# power in th# Reichawehr in the npheavai created by the 
Haai#.
aermanmlation# with China ateadily deteriorated after 
the failure of mediation in th* conflict* There were rumor# 
in China during the winter and early apring of 1938 that the 
Oerman# would wttŴ raw their adviaer# and that the arm# trade 
would be atopped* Ck& April 27$ 1938$ Field Marahal O&ring 
forbade the exportation of German war material# to China and 
the Aaaociation of Exporter# wa# notified of the deci#ion.3@
^̂ Mao Tao' t̂ung# CR Protracted war (faking* Foreign 
language# freaa# 19$W$ f*-3l$ ' (Ke#crib*#"the conflict a# a pro­
tracted war in the #chem* of the Communiât pattern of cwiqueat 
of China* for he write# that the "firat atage i# one of the 
enemy*# atrategic offenalve and our atrateglc d*f*n#lve. The 
#*cond atage i# one of the ene#*y*a atrateglc defenaive and our 
preparation for the counter-offenaive. The third atage ia one 
of our ceunter-offenaive and the enemy*# atrateglc retreat*"
39Memo by Wddhl, Apr* 28$ 1938$ D.G.F.f*. D$ I, 8^7.
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Chlang Xal-ah#k triad onca mora ta imprava tha relatlona 
with Oarmany, and Traatmann wa# aakad to #aa tha Chlmeaa marnhal 
ta diaaua# tha qaaatlMi of dallvarla# of war material#» Chiang 
*tatad that avan Italy# with which China had moat um»atl#factory 
relation#, had not atoppad tha delivery ef aapplla# already 
ordered. Only recently Italian tank# and plane# had been 
ahlppad to China; baalde#, tha barter agreement of 1936 had 
bean in force for a long time.
It would# continued Chlang# be a great dlaappolntment 
to China If Oermany ehould dlacontlnue dellverie#, Deaplte 
the recognition of Manchuria, the Chineee National government 
had tried to continue the old frlendahlp. If Germany terminated 
the exlatlng contract# when other power# were * t l l l  making 
dellverie# to China# the feeling# of the Chineee people toward 
Germany would be affected very eharply. If the former relation# 
continued, China wa# prepared to Improve Oermany## po#ltlon In 
the economic and other fleldaAO
In May 1938 the German adviaer# were recalled from China 
by Hitler; thl# wa# particularly regretMd by the German merchant# 
who feared that wlde-apread antl#Germam reaction by the Chineee 
would reault In a draetlc lo## of trade.^^
^^rautmann to Foreign Mlniater# May 9, 1938# , 582,
^^New York Time#, May 11̂ , 1938,
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On M&y 29# 1938# Hlfotm le ft the J»p»neee Foreign Office; 
however# at *m earlier date he had laid devh the principlea 
which weald determine the fatare peliciea for participation with 
the Oerman and Italian governmwinta in the economic fie ld  in China# 
The anchanging goal waa the eatabllahment of a new order in 
Aaia in which the relation# of both the Axi# and Weetern nation# 
would he governed by #apan. The relation# with other govern* 
Mwint# woald not be made by profeeaion# or pledgee# but aolely 
by the criterion of expediency
Hirota intended neither to reapect the treaty right* of 
the weatern power# nor to honor hi# own aa#arancea that they 
would be preaerved* He waa careful to warn hi# aubordinatea 
that Oermaî r and Italy could not be allowed a preferred 
poaition in China# The mode# preacribed for German 
participation were limited to thoae moat advantageou# for 
Japan her#elf**namely# the aupply of capital and of machinery 
upon credit with previaion for aharing ah# management of 
particular enterpriaea.W
The Japaneae were not anxiou# to make an agreement on 
paper with Qermany about China# Th* Japaneae fe lt  that an 
oral pro*memoria would do. In a converaation between von 
Rlbbentrop and Tog* early In June 1938* the propoaal wa# made#
. Mil. Trib# for the Far Eaet# 48*676*7, 
^^Ibid., 48#677*8.
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h*d don* her p&rt by «topping tho #rm# trade and 
recalllag the advlaor# from China. Tago referred to the 
prevloaa converaation# with the Oerewn foreign mlniater 
regarding economic cooperation beteeen Germany and ^pan in 
North China# and handed the German mlniater the oro-memorla% 
the Japaneae ambaaaador remarked that It waa not Intended to  
he a formal treaty but merely a record of oral atatamenta 
exchanged. Becaaae It repaired a camberaome procedure involving 
the Privy Council# It %faa not conaldered adviaable to conclude a 
formal treaty. Nawever# the aaaurancea were backed up by the 
word of honor of the Japaneae government* Regarding the 
document# the Japaneae ambaaamder atated that It repreaented 
the maximum he had been able to  obtain from Tokyo* Von 
Rlbbentrop replied that he would have to examine the content# 
and that the Japaneae ambaaaador would receive a cemm%micatlon 
regarding any change# dealred, Togo declared hi# wlllingneaa 
to receive much propoaal# for amendment# but he did not believe 
that many more change# could be made in the text*W4
Von Rlbbentrop alao pointed out to the japaneae ambaaaador 
#aat the German aervicea to Japan, the German loaaea in China# 
the Inadequate Japaneae cooperation# mould be conaldered in 
drawing up the agreement. The following day the Japaneae 
ambaaaador oppeaed the auggeatlon that the conceaaions be
^Rlbbentrop to Togo, June 2# 19)8, D.G.F.P*, D, I# 86$.
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mppll#d to &11 p»rt# of Chino under Jopomeee control end 
thnt Oernony ohould receive better treatment then third 
poeere,^^
Ail during June the diecueelone pertaining to the pro* 
memorie continued end the government* were deadlocked. Von 
Ribbentrop claimed that in return for Germany** recognition 
and aeeietance, Germany meat receive generou# treatment in 
regard to China, Togo replied, cordially and guardedly within 
the narrow limit of Hirota** policlee, that Japan could not 
aeeure Germany, in a treaty, of better treatment than other 
third power** The German foreign minieter e%pre**ed die* 
$ati*faction but hopefully coiM:laded that Japan wa* prepared 
to offer in practice what ahe would not concede in categoriaal 
treaty form*̂ 6
Von Rlbbentrop wa* diailluaioned with hi* *&ŷ  On July 
21̂ , 1938, the German foreign Miniatry received from it* 
repreaentative in China a detailed report upon the condition* 
in the occupied area* of that country. The exact oppoeite of 
th* guarantee* of the Japan*** government in the Bro#memoria 
aeemed to be happening to the German merchant* in China. The 
Japaneae authoritie* were practicing a ay*t*matic diacrimination 
agalnat German inetereat*, Eatabliehed German firm* were
Mil. Trib, for the Far East, 1̂ 8,71̂ 0,
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injured by the preference# given to the Japeneee
f  if&#,47
The v&8«ely»formulmted Jepeneee offer of "e#pecd#lly 
f&vopeble treatment" wa* regarded inadequate by Germany;
Japan appeared to be embarking upon a rathle## campaign 
to aupprea# foreign trade, including the German trade which 
wa# #0 badly needed by the Oerwin armament indaatry. On 
Aagnat 9, 1938, von Rlbbentrop wired Germany*# reaaon# for 
rejecting the japaneae pro#.memoria.K®
Germany deaperately needed to build up her armament 
ind%*atry and could n#e a* much tungaten from China a* #he 
Gonld get, Idarahal Chiang Mal*ahek, m tlll without aid from 
Great Britain or the United State#, needed material# to wage 
war againet the A&pane#e. On September 1, 1938, another 
contract wa* aigned by Germany and China for more arm# and 
munition*. The Chineee Munition# parchaae Commi##ion, which 
had *tayed in Berlin daring the German and Japaneae negotiation#, 
aigned the contract,^9
W .74I.
lj.9 Memo by Wiehl, June 2, 1938, p,G*F.P** D, I, 867.
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Th# J*p»n### government *»# #o #»r# of v ic to r y  in Chin# 
thmt i t  thought I t  could r#up the fr u it#  o f the Chine## economy 
#nd u*e thut country in  # *&r uguinmt the S o v iet Union, &nd i t  
f e l t  %o need to  mmke conceeelone to  other power#, even to  i t#  
* l l y ,  Qermuny,
CHAPTER IV 
DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTNERS
Once Jip&n h&d #ecar*d from Germany the cancellation of 
the SIaD*Oermaa war contract* and the withdrawal of German 
m ilitary  advlaer* from China* Japan wa# no more anxloaa to 
give Germany a poaltion of more advantage In China than any 
other power. Germany quickly aenaed Japaneae ingratitude 
and reacted to i t .  From July 1938 throughout the following 
year, Germany repeatedly complained agalaat japaneae dlacrimin- 
a tlen  againat German buainea* by confiscation of property and 
other offense*. Even the pro^Japaaese German ambassador in 
Tokyo, Ott, complained that in return for a l l  the German 
effort* in the Sino*japanese conflic t on behalf of Japan, 
Germany was actually getting worse treatment than was accorded 
to Great Britain,*
Not only did Japan damage Sino*German commercial trade 
relation# and put the German merchant# In opposition to her 
polic iea , but also her actions caused disagreement within 
Germany about the F&hr#r*s policies in the Far East, Dr. 
Schacht, the president of the Reiehsbank and Economics 




tr*d* with Chlnm, Schacht h&d almost succeeded in developing 
the Sino#@*fm*n trade on a large acal# by the time H itler 
recalled the German m ilitary adviser* and br*k& off trade 
relation* with China. When H itler had shown preference to 
Japan as the s tab iliz ing  force againat Communia* in the Far 
Saat, he interfered with Schacht*s plana. The economics 
minister recognized the move a* a fa ta l  mistake, stating 
tha t Japan would never be able or willing to compensate 
Germany for the loa* of trade with China.2
Japan kept up it*  rela tionship  with the German* through 
the agency of Major General Oshima, the Japanese ambassador 
in Berlin. Hi* relationship  was particu larly  close with H itler 
and von Ribbentrop, The Japanese army influenced the Japanese 
cabinet and was a strong pressure group in Internal as well 
as foreign po lic ies . The army** power was demonstrated during 
a meeting on August 9 ,  1936, at which the proposal for a 
general alliance with Germany was considered. The cabinet 
was content to leave the matter of concluding the alliance 
in the hands of the m ilitary , Oahima was advised by the
*Civil Affair* Division, Trial# #f the MaJor War Criminals 
Before the International M ilitary W ^ t s ^ ï . klT, (Washington, b #
Also, according to the War Department's, Has! Cansplrao 
and Aaarasslon# I I ,  739, Dr, Schacht had a fascinating career 
the TklW^lAeich, in 1933 he was recalled by H itler to the 
presidency of the Reiehsbank, minister of economics in August 
1934f add in May 193$ general plenfpotentlary for the War 
economy. He was reappointed to the Reiehsbank in 1937 but 
dismissed in Jmmnary 1936. Me was dismissed from his Job a# 
economic* minister in 19W»
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»rii^ geaer#! #t»ff th*t both the cabinet and the army 
were in favor of the von Ribbentrop propoeal of a cloaer alliance 
with Japan, in which the Antl#Comintern Pact would be atrengthened.3 
Japanese rule in China became too much for Germany and, in 
the f a l l  of 1936, Ambaaa&dor Ott in Tokyo preaented a H at of 
126 inveatigated caaea of damagea auffared by (lerman buaineaa* 
men there* The caae* had bean reported individually by notaa 
verbale#, h itherto  le f t  unanawared, to the Japaneae Foreign 
Niniatry, The H at pointed out the Incomprahenoible contraat 
between the Japaneae a ttitu d e  tcward the BritIeh and German 
commercial claim#. According to the atatamenta in the preaa,
Japan warn promiaing Great B rita in  conaideration for individual 
claim# if  the B ritiah  modified th e ir  general a t t i tu d e  toward 
the Chine## conflic t to  re f lec t favor to Japan. The aame, 
continued the note by Ott, waa refuaed to  Germany, even though 
th ia  condition wa# long alnce fu l f i l le d  in practice on Germany*# 
own in i t ia t iv e .^
The German ambaaaador in Tokyo reported on November 26 
to  the German Foreign Miniatry that the Chine## had once more 
rejected the new Japaneae proposai# for peace and that there
3Int. Mil. Trib. for the Far 2a#t. 1|.8,772.
^ t  to Foreign Niniater, Nov, 7, 1938, D.G.F.P., D, IV, 690.
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we# no pfeeent po*#lbllfty for peace in the Per Ee#t^ beceuae the
Japanese were trying to form a Chinese government theœselvet*̂  
The ^panese government had grown impatient in the hope of making 
a sa tisfac tory  settlement with Chiang Pai*shek. In the last 
few month# the Japanese army had again made tremendous gain# 
in China but s t i i l  had not defeated the Chinese National Army 
which was retreating in space in order to advance in time*,*that 
is* yielding the area slowly and parposefulty* in order to 
outlast the enemy and eventually gain victory ,?
The war had become costly  to both sides. I t  drained the 
resource# and much of the war reserves Japan could have used 
against the Soviet Union* but no matter how bad the situa tion  
became for JWpan* she could never make peace on Chiang K&l*sh#k*s 
terms. The peace had to  be on Japanese terms. In purchasing 
timbrby the mile* the Chinese could not afford to yield intact 
cities*  factories* communications* mines* docks, warehouses* and 
other businesses and goods, Such concessions would only p ro fit
?$chroeder* 9* writes that the Japanese term# of November 
1938 for peace with Chiang Kai*shek would have made China a 
vas*ai#atate, Japanese troops woaid be stationed in Inner 
Mongolia and North China, Moreover* Japanese o ff ic ia ls  would 
supervise Chinese land and water cowaanications* m ilitary and 
police organisations, raw material# for defense and currency* 
t a r i f f  and maritime customs a d m in is t ra t i f ,  Chiang Kal*shek 
had rejected the proposals* deeuwding th#  the Japanese f i r s t  
must leave China,
^Ott to  Foreign Minister* Nov. 26* 1938, D.G.F.P** D* IV* 693.
7paul M, A. Llnebarger* The China of Chiang Xai*#hek 
(Boston: World peace Poundati'aa* 191*.!)* fÈ?
75
h#nce the mcorched e&fth policy,^ Thl# type of wmr- 
fare made both the regular* &Ad goerilia# effective agaiaat 
Japan and made each of them tru ly  dependent upon the other*
While Chiang Kal-*ehek was practicing hla acorch&d earth 
policy, the Cermana were once more sending him war material#.
The German# were not accepting new order# but were willing 
to f i l l  the old order# in substantial quan tities . These 
shipment# of munititm# custommrily proceeded via French 
Indo#China,9 In early  1939the)Chine#e government hoped that 
i t  might be able to obtain further munition* from G^rminy and 
tha t the opportunity might occur to  take advantage of the 
desire a t i l l  existing among the German businessmen for 
commerclai relation# between Germany and C h i n a . B e r l i n  
was used by the Chine## government a# a p o li t ic a l  observation 
post,
Al*o# in early 1939 there were some changes made in the
German Foreign Office. Von Ribbentrop, the German foreign
minister» had reorganised th is  office to #uch an extent that
i t  waa in a s ta te  of confusion. Von Hassell wrote in his diary*
he, von Ribbentrop, has s t i l l  not received Ambassador 
Trantmann, who returned almost a half a year ago from 
China, He is  no more inclined to  l is ten  to divergent 
views than his lord and master. The peace in the 
Foreign Office, i t  seems, border# on the %wbearablej 
It 1# a fran tic  merry.,go*r@und in which everybody*#
        ..
®JMi*
9oilbert to  Secretary of S tate, Jan. 7, 1939, U.S. For. 
R el., 1939, I I I ,  737.
(Olbld., 737'"738.
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nefv** #fe getting fr#yed. Even the hlgheet off i d #  le— 
with the yoeeible exception of Wei*##eker, end he too 
in a limited extent«*know nothing abont the p o li t ic a l  
objective# and general line# of policy#**
Out of the reorganieation came von Schmieden*# removal a#
chief of the Par Eastern Division of the German Foreign Office#
In February 1939 the Japaneae ambaaaador wa* requested to
v is i t  the Germein foreign o ffice . Van Ribbentrop explained to
him that Germaw was a t i l l  waiting for the Japaneae government*#
pro^memorla about German#Japanese cooperation in China, in
which Germany would receive a privileged position above the
other powers in Japane#e#occapled China, The Japanese govern#
ment, however, did not want to  go too fa r  with Germany and was
s ta l l in g .  The Japaneae ambassador replied that the chief
obstacle new wa* the Japaneee finance minister, idio had been
superseded in the recent changes in government. Bat the
ambassadof eaphasited that he was optimistic about the situation
Since the Japanese foreign minister had recently bean won over
in favor of the pro##memorla, and the Germn foreign minister
knew that the Japanese arsy had always been in favor of it .^3
Ott reported to  Berlin that the Japanese were unwilling
to commit themaelve# formally to a preferen tia l position In
China for Germany,^4 But dipicMmt* such as von Hassell saw a
^%lrich von H assell, The von Hassell Diaries, 1938#19hh. 
(Garden City, New York* Dou&Ie*lsy''''tomp^  ̂ j%"f), 1̂ % Apparently 
von Ribbentrop was trying to reorganise foreign policy and was 
removing o f f ic ia l s  opposed to h is  p o l ic ie s ,
^^Peek to Secretary of State, Feb. 2, 1939, U.S. For. Rel, ,
"I# 738.
by Wiehl, Feb. 6, 1939, D.G.F.P., D, IV, 700.01,
% > tt  t o W i e h l ,  Mar, 1$, 1939, D.G.F.P,, D, IV, 712,
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p0#$lble molutlan to  the S(AO*jap»ne#e conflic t tha t cocld 
be accepted by e ither  »ide& Von Heeeell thoaght that the 
Japaneae woald to le ra te  eoathern China ander Chiang Kal*ahek 
i f  Japan could take a firm grip on the reiaalAder.^4 Although 
it  remained to  be eeen i f  Chiang Kal«ehek would agree to #uch 
a proposal, i t  was sa tiefactory  for Germany because she could 
then draw the raw materials she needed from the southern part 
of China.
Because of the world s itua tion  in 1939, i t  was very 
important that Germany get raw materials for her armament 
industries. The German economics minister, who believed tha t 
Germany had more to gain through direct negotiations with 
Chiang Kai-shek than through a victorious Japan, sent a German 
businessman, Voigt, who had lived in Shanghai, to Chunking, the 
capital of N ationalist china. The Germans were pressing the 
Chinese to carry out the terms of the barter agreement of 1936 
and avoiding the removal of some terms which the Chinese wanted 
dropped.
China was in a d i f f i cul t  position to bargain with the 
Germans. Since the beginning of h o s t i l i t i e s  with Japan, China 
had not been carrying out the terms of the 1936 barter agraament 
excepp under a supplement negotiated a year af ter  the original 
date of signature in which Germany had granted a cash cred it
^ o n  Haaaell, 36.
^^Peek to Secretary of State, Mar, 28, 1939, U.S. For. Rel
1 2 ^ , i n ,  661.
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ef IOO,OOOfOOO Relch$imrk» for the ptifchmse of wer suppllee. 
This credit was exhausted In March 1939*
An agreement waa reached even though Marshal Chiang 
viewed Germany with some disfavor afnce Hitler*» action in 
ordering the m ilitary advisers back to Germany,. The marshal 
had been most annoyed that H itler had set a time limit for 
th e ir  departure under the threat of confiscating th e ir  property 
and depriving them of citieenship; thls^ Chiang regarded as 
humiliating,:^?
Another important factor in the negotiations for a new 
barter agreement was that i t  decreased in value even though 
the Germans were offering to accept Chinese raw material in 
payment for war equipment# Japan was making i t  increasingly 
d i f f i cu l t  to export, though Manchuria over the Trans*rSIberian 
ra ilroad , the Chinese products desired by Germany# Also, the 
Germans refused to supply completely manufactured m ilitary  
equipment and would s e l l  only that which could be assemblsd 
in China.
Germany needed the barter agreement concluded In tiarch 
1939* Hitler pointed out in a meeting with Mussolini th is  
need and outlined the s itua tion  on Germany*» p a r tr  arimmsnt» 
were not ready and would not be ready for two more yearsi
to secretary of S ta ts , U.S, For, R sl.. 1939. III. 
661. (Mar, 28, 1939).................................................... .— ^
17Ibid,
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the n&vy w&e Imcktng; Japan wa# toe engaged to be able to 
give $uoy e f fe c tiv e  aid* I')
The German F&hrer waa convinced that Japan could not be 
relied upon In the neat war. In China, Japan had taken on too 
mtch. Hitler aaid In May 1939 that Japan wa# a weighty problem  ̂
even at fIrat, Japan*# collaboratlmi with Germany appeared to 
be aomewhat cool and reetrlcted, bat It waa In Japan*# own 
Intereat to take the in itia tive  in attackliqg Ra*#Ia»20 perhap# 
thia waa oae of the reaaona why Oermany cfmclnded the German» 
soviet non»aggre$alon pact in Augomt 1939$ Japan could do 
nothing at that tine to help In a war againat the Soviet iMIan* 
Perhapa Japan knew the poaltion ahe waa In. The Slno# 
Japaneae conflict had been a drain t^on her reaoureea and kept 
more than a millIan aaldlera occ$^Ied* HIranama became premier 
In May 1939 and he took a fremh In itiative toward Germany with 
a declaration In the form of a pera«%al meaaage to H itler, 
expreaaing a deaire for an agreement to atrengthen the Anti» 
Comintern Pact. The offer wa# coldly received by the Germn# 
becaaae of the reaervatlon made by HIr&nama tM t Japan wa# 
unable, at that time or in the near future, to extend to the 
A%i# Power# aiQT effective military aid.^^ Hlrannma did promiae 
that Japan would gladly aupport (Germany under different 
circumstance#. Von Ribbentrop asked whether, if  the German#
l^Gaitazzo Cinno, The Ci&no DIarle#» 1939»h3. ed. by Hugh 
Gibson (Garden City, Hew'Y§¥Wt~'"'lfouhïeda^^ 19^6), ^0 ,
20rr*âl of Major War Criminal# Befw# the International
21 j .  Ballm&tina# "Mukden to Pearl". Foreign
XXVII (July 19l̂ 9>f 6^^. —
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#nd went to  w»r w ith another natiwij, Japan coaid b#
considered a t  war w ith th a t n a tio n  even though ahe coaid not 
provide any m ilita ry  a id * ^
The atrnggle# w ith in  Hirannma*a cab inet continued. 
R eferring  to  the im predictable natu re  of developmenta in 
Europe and to  Germaw** immediate o b je c tivee, the opponent# 
of Hiranuma*# p lan  argued th a t  .h&pan would not be capable of 
ac tio n  fo r  year# to  come. Japaneae army c irc le #  repeated ly  
atreaaed  Japmnf# extenaive commitment# in  China and expreaaed 
the hope th a t ,  ahould the  oocaaion a r ia e ,  invocation of the 
German a llia n c e  would be delayed a# long a# po»#lble,23
Japan al$o had problem# with Oreat B r i ta in  over the  
occupation in  China. Anglo#Japaneee ten#ion# came to  a head 
in  the  eummer of 1939. in  Jane of th a t year the Japaneae 
fo re ig n  m iniater explained to  Ambaaaador O tt th a t  the r ig id  
Japaneae a t t i tu d e  of exclualon of a l l  fo re igner#  in China 
waa p a r t  of a comprehenatve move aga ina t Great B r ita in  and 
China. The purpoee of th ia  move wa# p rim arily  to  win over 
the Chine## amiaae# fo r  a new c e n tra l government which would 
be Japan### dominated. Japan wa# determined to  se t up the 
new government under the guiding hand of Wang Ching-wel.
The n e g o t ia t io n s  were p ro g re ae in g  fa v o ra b ly  so t h a t  th e  
fo re m tio n  of such a gw ernm ent in  China could  be expected
-3o tt to F ore ign  A linister*  iiay 2, 1939, B.C.P .P . ,  D,
IV* 398#9. — .
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Aoon* O tt wa* t o l d  t h a t  Japan hoped a  m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e  
w ith  Gerjnany (propoaed by Hlranuma) alight be concluded aoon.
Such an a l l i a n c e  would g ive support to  th e  c r e a t io n  of th e  
government of Wang Chfng-wel, The Japanese fo re ig n  m in is te r  
h in te d  t h a t  i f  Germany and I t a l y  would reco g n lae  the  nev;
Nanking government under Japaneae dom ination. I t would be a 
pa in fu l blow to  Chiang Kai-aliek and the powera behind him*2li 
The German*, however, were h e a ita h t about Japaneae p o lic iea  
In China. Aa la te  aa Ju ly  1939 the German* openly gave 
evidence th a t they did not intend to  put a l l  of " th e ir  China 
egg* in  the Japaneae commercial b a s k e t ." ^  The German* 
con tracted  d ire c t ly  w ith China fo r  the d e liv e ry  of th ree  Condor 
plane* and of arm* and ammunition, in exchange fo r aoma 20,000,000 
Chinese dollar** worth of metal* and orea fro #  the aouthem  p a r t  
of china s t i l l  under Chiang** c o n tro l,^ ^
The Japanese brought much p r e s s u re  in  B e r l in  over 
Germany** t r a d e  r e l a t i o n *  w ith  Chiang Kai^fShek, The 
c o u n s e l lo r  of th e  Japaneae emibaaay* Uaami, a&w th e  d i r e c t o r  
of th e  p o l i t i c a l  economic departm en t, K no li, and a&ld t h a t  
th e r e  were a t i l l  aoeie f a c to r *  d is tu rb in g  German*Japane#e 
economic c o o p e ra t io n  in  N orth  C hina. For e x a a ^ le ,  Germany*# 
# o * ca lle d  Hapro agreement ( th e  b a r t e r  agreement* between China
2 ^ t  to  Foreign M in iste r, June Ih, 1939, G .G .F .P ., D, IV, 72^, 
% u * # , 390.
26Ib id . Also,  Snow, I80, c la im s th a t the  immediate r e a u l t  
of the European war waa to  cu t off Chunking*# moat important 
source of munition#: Germany, The Nasi*, d esp ite  the  Anti#
Comintern f a c t ,  supplied China w ith over 60 p#f c*ht of her 
munition# import# as  la te  a# Ju ly  193$.
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and Germany) was caus ing  a c e r t a i n  amount of d i s q u i e t  In Tokyo. 
Uaaml would ba g r a t e f u l  f o r  more d e t a i l e d  in fo rm atio n  about 
th e  t r e a t y ;  th e  a o r t  of goods exchanged, th e  amount of c r e d i t ,  
d u r a t io n ,  e t c .  The Germans were a p p a re n t ly  c a r e l e s s  about th e  
German-Japaneae r e l a t i o n s ;  Knoll w ro te  t l i a t  he liad g iven  th e  
Inform at ion  t o  Usaa l ,  but t h a t  he had emphasized t h a t  d e l i v e f l t a  
of war m a te r ia l s  were excluded under th e  Hapro t r e a t y . ^ ?
T h is  answer d id  n o t s a t i s f y  Uaami and he wanted t o  know 
more about th e  tv/o p a r t l c u l a i  c a se s  o f  a l le g e d  d e l iv e r y  of 
War m a te r ia l  t o  C hina. One concerned  th e  f irm  of Slemssen 
which was new to  K noll, and he prom ised t o  look in to  I t ;  th e  
o th e r  caocerned th e  f i rm  of Augsburg & C o . ,  and Knoll r e p l i e d  
t h a t  t h i s  was a Swiss f irm  and he cou ld  do no th ing  about I t .^8
Chi August 2$, 1939* on top of the German-Japanese s tra in e d  
r e la t io n s ,  came the announcement th a t Germany and the Soviet 
Ihiion had signed a non-aggression p a c t. This pact v io la te d  » 
s e c re t agreement a ttached  to  the AntI-Comintern Pact of 1936, 
signed by Germany, I ta ly  and JSpan. This c lause s t ip u la te d  
th a t  no p o l i t i c a l  t r e a ty  should be concluded with the Soviet 
Union w ithout mutual consen t.^9
The Japanese had always thought t h a t  t h e i r  a l l y  would 
never make an agreement w ith  S ov ie t R ussia  because of th e  
a n t f - B o ls h e v I s t  views of th e  German R e ich sch an ce llo r*  The
27Memo by Wiehl, Aug. 2, 1939, D.G.F.P. ,  D, IV, 10l|.̂ .
28 Ibid.
^%erman Lutz ,  Toreign Policy of the Third Reich",
Current H istory  XXVIII (A pril 19^^), " '
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mhock w«L# & m ortal blow to  the Hlranwma cab ine t which had 
maintained the  idea of securing a atrong m ilita ry  a llia n c e  
w ith Germany againat R u e * l a , 80
China» however, waa ready to  take advantage of th ia  
change. The Chineae aabaeaador in  B erlin  expreaaed complete 
a a tia fa c tie n  a t  the  cone la# ion of the Germin#5ovlet P ac t, and 
# tated  th a t  hi# government wa# anxioa# to  know i f  th i#  woald 
provide an opportunity  to  improve 5in#«aerman re la t io n e . Von 
WeiaeKcker p a t a damper on theae hope#. The Germane did not 
intend to  aee th e ir  re la tio n #  w ith Japan change a# a re$ n lt 
of the Oerman*Boviet non#aggre##ion pact* *he deeired  peace 
in Ea*t A#ia.8^
Deapite th e  d i f f ic u l t ie #  Japan had w ith  Germeny in the 
beginning of World War II» Japan** main aim wa* m tlll  an 
ea rly  conclaeion of the Sino*japane»e co n flic t#  Ott reported  
to  B e rlin  th a t  the  power which coaid a id  Japan in the conclaaion 
of the 5 ino*Japaneae c o n f lic t  might e#en obtain  the  abandoniwnt 
of Japaneee n e u tr a l i ty  a t a la te r  phaae of the war. The 
oupporter* of a pro.#German p o licy  aaw the  p o # $ ib ili ty  of 
fa r th e r  cooperation  aga ina t England, i f  Germany coaid diaaoade 
the  Soviet Union from aapporting Chiang Kai*#hek.32
30Bal i a n t in#» 6$6,
3%Memo by Welagâcker» Aug. 26, 1939, D.G.E.P, .  D, V II, 333. 
The Chine## ambaaaador waa not to ld  the re a l' r^ am i*  fo r  the 
German^Soviet non*aggresaion p a c t.
8 ^o tt to  Foreign N in ia te r , Sept. 8, 1939, D.G.F.P. .  D, V III28. •rlitr-irir'-irrwr-o--
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VoA Weisz&cker, the German undersecretary  of the Foreign 
O ffice , did not want to  give up the idea of c lo se r cooperation 
between Germany and China* He suggested th a t von Ribbentrop 
c a l l  Trautmann back to  h is  post in the Geeman embassy In 
Chungking, an a c tio n  which would be very encouraging to  the 
Chinese government# Von Ribbentrop re p lie d  on September 10, 
1939 , th a t "the Foreign M inister has decided th a t Ambassador 
Trautmann is  to  remain in  Germany and th a t  no change in o«&r 
present lin e  toward# China can be considered#"33
The Japaneae government took a n e u tra l p o s itio n  a f te r  the 
f a l l  of the Hiranuma cab inet because of the German«^8oviet pact# 
Japan put Germany on equal foo ting  w ith the other powers as f a r  
as  China was concerned# On September 1939, the Japanese 
government announced th a t  i t  would no t become involved in the 
European war; i t  expressed the  d es ire  th a t  the German (French, 
B r i t is h ,  e t c . ) ,  government r e f ra in  from a l l  measures which 
might be p re ju d ic ia l to  the p o s itio n  of Japan in  the China 
c o n f l ic t .  I t  gave the  b e ll ig e re n t power# f r ie n d ly  advice to  
withdraw th e ir  troops from a l l  p a r ts  of China occupied by Japan, 
in which case th e  Japanese government would do everything in  
i t s  power to  p ro te c t the  live#  and property  of the  n a tio n a ls  
of the b e il ig e re a t power a ,3^
33Memo Dy Weiss&cker, Sept. 8 , 1939, Ibid#, 32.
Akkmo by Knoll, Sept. 13, 1939, Ib id . ,
8$
ChîîUL w#$ not com pletely dieconrnged by von Ribbentrop*# 
mnever to  von Wel##&cker abont the propoeml to  bring the  two 
government#, aermeny and China, elo$er to g e th e r . In the 
f a l l  of 1939 an a n o ff lc la l  f e e le r  wa# received from a Chlneae 
o f f i c ia l ,  the coamaellor of the  Chlne$e emba*#y In B e rlin , 
who aaggeated th a t I f  Germany woald a$e her good o ffic e# ,
Chiang Kal*#hek might be ready to  m ettle th e  mer In a manner 
favorab le  to  Japan. In r e ta m  fo r  the m ediation, Chiang Kal«#hek 
moaW o rie n t h ie  p o llc le#  toward OermaiQf and againat England.
The Oerman fo re ig n  O ffice , however, re faaed  to  conalder m ediation. 
Since Japan e%# a n re lia b le  and might even l in e  ap w ith the  Weot 
In a long war, the  Oerman# believed  I t  woald be b e t te r  to  keep 
Japan weak and to  leave her t ie d  down by the aaa lem ted  war in  
Chlna*3$
China wa# not throagh making propoaal# to  Germany aboat 
c lo#er cooperation* In November 1939 the prime m ln leter of 
the China## gavemment, Dr. Kang, who had peraonal co n tro l over 
the a ta te  monopoly of the prodmctlon of tang#tea  and other 
m atala, meat of which wa# pledged to  England and the Soviet 
Union and to  Ameflca fo r  repayment of a  loan , to ld  th e  Oermen# 
th a t  he waa. In p r in c ip le , prepared to  make the d e llv e r le # .
Dr. Kang aaked th a t before any concrete d e ta il#  were dl#ca##ed 
w ith th* o ther power#, Germany make a atatem ent th a t  payment
3^&clwroeder,
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mmd# by of Oermmn dmHvorle# of &r#* awd
(rifle#* light #ad b#»vy «mchine gim#* mmwmition 
for iight artillery  and fie ld  ga*#), Kang had already refaaed 
oaah âyme&t# from other power#. Im caae of a Oermam comaent 
to the propoaal, Kaag woald be w illing to **gaarantee dellverle# 
to Oeramny for the next $0 y ea r  a ,  "36 K%ag aleo hinted that he 
wonld even make aae of the orea pledged to E%%land and other 
coantriea in order to aopply Oenmuy, provided the arfai^ement 
waa kept eecret.
A few day# later von Ribbentrop refaaed thia propoaai.
On the other hand̂  he weald be in agreement i f  important raw 
material# coaid be obtained from Chiang Xai*#hek in exchange 
for other Qerman prod%*ct#* each a# phafmaoeàtical#.3T po##ibiy 
vw% Ribbentrop refaaed becaaae Oermany waa concentrating on 
defeating the a llled  power# in Weatern Earope* or he had hope# 
that Germany and Japan might get back together if  a peace wa# 
made in the Par Eaat^
When in Janwtry 19*10 the Yonai cabinet took o ffice , Ja;%ne#e 
pablic opinion wa# gradaaliy changing and again favored co^ 
operation with Germany, The h oatilitie#  toward the Soviet Union 
had diminiahed; at learnt there had been no major border claahe# 
between Raaeia and Japan, The pro*Oerman groap realieed, how* 
ever* that Papan coaid not intervene in Earope anlee# the China
36f,iemo by Bidder, Nov. 11, 1939, D.G.F.P, ,  D, Will* 397.
37wemo by Ritter, Nov, 17* 1939* ibid. ,  1(.18.
a?
eanflict mad intern*! pelltlcm l dl*cen#l@A reeolved.^a
B*t the etreggle In Chin* h*d not been ended* Chleng X*i#ehek 
w*e holding on In * »t*!em*ted **r.
!n Cbln^# j*p*n v** ploying e*ch elde mgalnet the other,
^*p*n *** e t l l l  negotiating with W*ng Chlng4#el for J*p*neee 
recognition of hi# regime and there wm# hope t*mt Ghlmng might 
yet come to term*# Japon wo* *tteeg>tlng to bring oboot * 
reconolllotlen wlUi Chiang either directly or throngh the 
Wong regime.39 jt* maeh a# von Ribbentrop wanted to hove * 
etrong Japan on the aide of (Himnâ y (which eoald happen If the 
gino#Japaneae conflict ended)* he Inatracted the Oerman 
diplomat# to  remain coi^letely reeerved If the ^aeatlon of 
the Wang Chlng# *̂*! recognition bromght apA*̂
Oa Warch 30, 19W, Japan fin a lly  created the regime 
of Wang Chlng#vel, the Jap#ne$e thoaght thia woald be the 
rain of Chiang %al*#hek, bat the chine*# mar aha! etabbomly 
foaght on,
Alao# In the aprlng of th* altaatlon changed in
the Earopean world, Th# fa ll  of France and the Nether land*, 
and the ###mtn$!y Imminent defeat of England, created for 
^pan an epportanlty to tarn frw# Chln% where #he waa bogged 
down* Into &omthea*t A#la,*<̂ ^
t^li, Trlb* fo^ the Far Eaat. 14.8,93$,
% b ld , ,  #*912.
^^Rlbbentrop to embaealee In Japan and China, Mar. 30, 19I4.O,
D, IX, $4 ,
^^Schroeder, 14.
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Th# *mw th#lr eîumc# in Indn*Chlim. Mo$t
of th# R*##1#A mimltioae went into China either thromgh 
Bttrma or lAdo*Chinm, Jepan wa# #nxio%# to do## th#
Ynanma railway* when th# Briti#h later agreed to do## the 
Barm# road, Chin# wa# l# ft with on# free root# of #npply**the 
deaert ront# from Ramaian Tnrhi#tan,k2
On Jtm# 12, 19!*̂ 0, Japan atrengthened her poaition in the 
far Eaat by omduding a non^^ggreaaion and frlendahlp ;%ct with 
Thailand# whoa# territorie# were adjacent to th# eaatern frontier 
of french indo,»China* th# earn# day, the Japan### South 
China armiea, atationed near the frontier of Indo#China announced 
that the greater part of th# weapon# and war material# which 
China parchaaed abroad were a t i l l  being tramaported to  Chunking 
via th# YWman railway* The announcement atated that #uch 
action by th# french IndomChineae aathoritie# in aid of Chiang 
Kai^#hek*a regi#* could not be overlooked,^)
Japan aecured an agreement in June from th# french to do##  
the northern lndo.*Chima border, Not only wa# the cloeing of the 
border profitable to Japan but ahe alao aeeured baee# in Inde# 
China for the war againat China. After having w«i thia 
victory from PrafK# on the day of the armiatice, the Japan### 
army wa# now ready to comdad# th# war in China. Oerman 
aucceaae# in Europe offered Japan remarkable opportunitie*  
in #outhea#t A#la*
^Snow, l80"81.
^)jnt. Mil. Trib. for the Far 2a#t. 14.8,922-3.
CWlPTER V 
*-n%E CHim PRCBLEkf
la  the $uwer menth* of 19*4.0  ̂ the jêp&aeee euddenly 
fee 1 (ted that Germwi occmpetlon of the Netherlende end Fmmce* 
end the epperent Inehlllty of BAQlend to do mnythlng in the 
for Beet, geve them en excellent o]M>ortimlty to exfeind thed# 
Co»proepef#ty Sphere to the eoetheeet. The wer In Chin* hed 
drelned from jepen moot of her w*r reeerve# end kept her eroy 
fighting In & etelemmted w*r# The *fm lt#* of the moetheeet 
were reedy for plocking.
At thi* time, too, the C^mene became anxloue to defeat 
dreet Brltelmf they thoaght that If jEngland had to fight # 
Pacific war It weeld be too mach for her end ehe wonId ane for 
peace. On the other hand, Japan conld not move agalnet Oreet 
Britain by attacking Singapore enlea# the ear In China were 
etopped. Thaa, both were anxloa* that aome kind of aolatlon 
be foand for "the China Problem."
Already In the apring dT I9I4O, the Jmpeneae foreign 
mlnleter, Sato, and ambaaaador to Oermany, Oehlma, had 
vlalted von Ribbentrop. The Japaneee had aaaared von 
Ribbentrop that they wlahed to allow dermany economic 
o;^ortunltles in China. It had been Japan** policy to be
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the he#t lA Chine with the ether power# ## gueete. The J#p*Ae#e 
th#t thi* policy h#d c###ed them to etroggle for ye#r# 
#0&iA$t the infleence of eooch coontrle# a# Great Britain* France 
and the iMited State#, With German economic aoelatamce* Japan 
aoald eacceed la her revolt againat the nlne-fpower treaty ayatem* 
aettle the war In China, and eliminate her dependence upon the 
IMlted State#,^
Bat in the apring of 1940# vw  Rlbjtentrop wa# not anxioa# 
to malw a étranger alliance with Jppan, and he wa# fu lly  aware 
of the p o litica l development# within Japan, The German foreign 
minlater replied camtloa»ly that he welcomed Japan*# deaire to 
cooperate, hat he gave the i#^re*aion that German, now 
confident of victory in Farope and peace with England, no 
longer attached great importance to aaaiatance from Japan 
in the war againat England, The German foreign minlater 
declared that new oppertanitiea for coopérât ion woald ari##, 
hat at thi# time he declined to aay anything definite on the 
ground# that he wa* unfamiliar with Japan*# p o litica l a lm a ,2 
It did not aeem fair to the Germmm Foreign Office that although 
Germany had made enormoaa economic aacrifiee# in China for 
Japan and mince the war had inalated upon a neutral role,
.hypan would come new and aak for an alliance,
^Int, Mil. Trih, for the Far Eamt. W,947,
^Ihld,, 48#948,
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The actual problem for Oermany aad the other power# waa 
that Japaa conaldered heraelf to  be ma#t#r la China. Japan 
wanted to control a ll  foreigner# regardleaa of nationality  
butf at the same time, she was technically and economically 
unable to take over China, The Japaneae had Interfered with 
the Chlneae trade, which was ao deaperately needed by GermazQf.
Good# had been bought by German# to be tranaported over the 
Trana#SIberian railway but did not get beycaW Manchuria.^
Becauae of thi# action by Japan, the German# were cool toward 
the Japaneae proposai of a military alliance. In the aprl:^ 
of 19!î 0, a change of Germany*# attitude would only be possible 
through p o litica l praaaure, the strength of which would depend 
on her military position against EnglandA
Then opportunity arose. Germany had defeated the British  
Expeditionary Force* and was now involved in *^OperatIon Sea 
Lion," The German planners thought England would weaken if  
Japan could be Induced to attack Singapore; It was almost 
Impossible for England to fight a war In the Atlantic and Pacific.^
Then came a note from Ott, the German ambassador in Tokyo, 
saying that dae to the recent military successes of Germany and
^Unsigned memorandum, July 26, 19hO« D.G.F.P, , D» X, 32h.
^Ibld.
W illiam L. Shlrer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich 
(New York* Simon and Schuster, 1V6U ; , 8Y3, »hlr er r sport is 
that th is viewpoint was taken by Hitler when he ordered (in  
a directive of Kbrch 19*41), that Singapore should be 
attacked. It could very well be that th is had been the Gerumn 
viewpoint since before Operation Sea Lion.
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the doming t#( the Burmeme mnd French Indo-Chlna border»,
J%p$n #m# no linger interemted In third power mediation for 
a peace In China. The German vlctoriea had raised Japanese 
ambitions for an advance into southeast A s i a . 6
Japan, however, had already been on the move in south* 
east Asia, Japan and Vlchy*France had concluded thatMatsuoka* 
Henry agreement of August 30, 19liO, after the dosing of the 
borders In Burma and lndo*Chlna. According to the agreement, 
the occs#atlon of Japanese troops In French lndo*Chlna was 
to be temporary, was to be solely for action against China, 
and would be limited to Tonkin Province,?
In early September Germany and Japan fin a lly  met to 
discuss a military alliance. The moderates In Japan were 
In favor of the pact, to be concluded very soon, because 
It would help J%)sn se ttle  the Oklna '^Incident'* by 
discouraging the Western powers from aiding Chiang Kai*ahek 
and woudd pave the way for an adjustment of relations with 
Russia, thus leading to an advance into southeast Asia, which 
was rich in raw materials Japan n e e d e d , G Alao, K«ioye fe lt  
that a Japan*A%ls alliance would restrain the iMlted States
6ott to Foreign Minister, July 27, 19bO, D.G.F.P., D,
X, 329*330,
?lnt. Mil, Trlb, for the Far East. b9,41).9. It shauld 




from ImtervwkUig In Europe; thw Jap&n would be helping 
Germany In the war he*Ides permitting a settlement in
China*9
Negotiation* between aermny and Japan for the conclusion 
of the tripartite alliance progressed rapidly, On September 21, 
igij.0, the esqperor was informed of the belief that if  the 
alliance wa* concluded, Japan would event%*lly have to oppose 
Great Britain and the United States; therefore, the war with 
China should be settled speediiy*!^)
On the same day (September 2?, 19W) that the Tripartite 
Pact was concluded between Germany, Italy and Japan, Premier 
Konoye made the following statement to the Japanese people 
in a radio broadoasti **Ve face an exwrgency uRprecedented 
in oar history. Enforcement of the treaty may become necessary 
, , Daring the past three years Japan ha* made tremendoa# 
sacrifices and lost many loyal soldiers, prolongation of the 
China war # . & has made li fe  difficalt."^^ The *Chlna Problem  ̂
had lasted too l«mg for Japan.
A foreign policy oat line was prepared by the Japanese 
government. The new policy provided that an effort «east be 
made to realise the general peace between Japan and China.
9ik les, 16$,
^O ln t . M il,  Trib, for the  Far East, 14-6,999•
llprieda Utley, "Japan** Great Bluff", lA&tlon CLI (October 
12, 1940), 321.
l^lnt. Mil, Trib. for the Far East. 49,297.
A plan **# formulated eoon after the
conclualon of the Tripartite Pact. The Japaneee government made 
an attempt to effect a aettlament with Chiang Kal^ehek and to 
employ hie troop#. A# a ra*#ad, China*# army would be allowed 
to annextthe Tonkin Province In French Ihdo*Chlna a# well a# 
northern Burma.U The military action In the aoutheaat againat 
ilngaipore wa# to begin upon aettlembnt with Qenorallamlmo 
Chiang Kal»#hek or upon Germany*# Invaalon of England, 
whichever occurred f ir a t . In the event that neither occurred, 
the actiwa wa# to com&ence when Germany had achieved acme 
*ub$tantlal mlllèary #acce#ae#.^^
The German#, at the conclualon of the Tripartite Pact, 
tried to help the Japaneae with their negotiation# for a 
cone lu#Ion of the $lno*Japaneae con flict. There were well 
aware that the conflict warn a atumbllng block for Japan, and 
a weak Japan wa# nf no value to Germany, Ambaaaador Ott 
reported to Berlin that on the occaalon of a celebration of 
the Japaneae^Itallan^German Frlendahlp Boelety, he had 
received reaaonable aaaurance that an agreement would aoon 
be reached between the regime of Chiang Rai*#hek and Wanb 
Ching«wel, After the contact# had been made, ctmduct of 
further aecret negotiation# warn tran#ferred to the Japaneae 
foreign minlater. The foreign minlater had not yet Informed
^̂ Int, MU, Tilb. for the Far Eaat.
:4%bld,, 1<.9,297.
9^
Ott about th# detail# of th# intended agreement, but he 
remarked that a* a iaat re$ort he would aak the Reich*# 
government if  he coaid count on it  for «apport* However, 
the Japan### foreign miniater emg>ha#i#ed that he could 
obtain hi# objective without German heip*^^
The new Japaneee miniater appointed to Bern had arrived 
in Berlin and informed the Japaneae ambaaaador that Matauoka 
Intended to take peraonal atepa with Chiang Kai'*ahek in order 
to bring about à aettlament of the Sino*Japaneae conflict.
The Japaneae foreign miniater waa perhapa too optlmiatic 
when he told Ott he would not requeat German helpj The 
Japaneae failed  to make an agreement with Chiang, The German 
government waa aaked to auggeat to Chiang XaWahek that 
Japaneae recognition of the #an|; Ching^wei regimie waa 
imminent, ^pan had once again demanded too much, for ah# 
wanted peace on her term# and not Chiang*#,
Germany tried to mediate when it  became increasingly 
important that Japan move againat England, Von Ribbentrop 
contacted the Chinese ambaaaador* Wentiaaing that relation# 
between Germany and China had been very good for a long time, the 
German foreign miniater aaid he waa convinced of a German
l^Ott to Foreign Minlater, Oct, 8, 191:0, D.G.F.P., D, XI, 269* 
^^Ott to Foreign Miniater, Nov, 7, 191:0, ibid, . #91.
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victory and he took * per#on*l intoreot la the situa tion  in 
the Far East, including the f i r a t  proapact# of termination 
of the Sino#Japane#e War. Von Ribbeatrop#* real reason for 
wanting the Sino-Japaneae War conclnded wa# that the japaneae 
government would probably recognize the Wang Ching^wei regime 
in the near future* Japan** action would presumably resu lt 
in similar recognition by Germany and Italy* Now von 
Ribbentrop wanted to know Chiang Kai*@hek*# viewpoint.
The Chinese ambassador said that in his opinion the government 
would certa in ly  be interested in a speedy conclusion of the 
conflict# which had already been going on for forty  months.
The Chinese ambassador personally believed that there was no 
use in fighting any longer. However, for the marshal, the 
prerequisite was s t i l l  the unconditional evacuation of 
Japanese troops from Chinese so il.*?  Japan recognised the 
regime of Wang Ching*wei. This recognition destroyed any 
po ss ib il i ty  of an agreement between Chiang Kai-shek and Japan.
Von Ribbentrop made one more t ry  to  mediate in the &iao* 
Japanese conflic t. He called the Chinese ambassador to the 
German Foreign Ministry and told him that since the v i s i t  of 
Molotov in November 19hO, the German government f e l t  that it  
would be to the in terest of China to bring an end to the
l^Memo by Stahmea, Nov. 11, 1940* Ibid. ,  $1$,
iGint, Mil. Trib. for the Far East, 49,428.
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con flic t. The German foreign mlnleter dwelt upon the 
European s itua tion , saying that he f e l t  certa in  the Germans 
had won hegemony In Europe and was certain  that the European 
war would be terminated by the end of the year. Germany would 
unite Europe. When th is  was accomplished, China could no longer 
expect assistance from B ritain  of the United States, Von 
Ribbentrop suggested that th is  was China** la s t opportunity 
to come to terms with Japan; otherwise, the Japanese would 
recognise Wang»Chfng*wel, Ita ly  was ready to recognise 
th is  regime and Germany, being a member of the Axis, would 
follow. Von Ribbentrop expressed the hope tha t China would 
make terms with Japan and that China would Join the Axis.
Germany would guarantee the fulfillm ent of the Japanese 
peace term s,*9
The Japanese situa tion  In China offered very l i t t l e  
favorable news in the winter and spring of 19^1. Chiang Kai* 
shek was holding on with American and B ritish  aid, Mataaok# 
came to Berlin and Rome to discuss the Japanese movements In 
the southeast; Germany wanted Japan to attack England. The 
situa tion  had grown worse for Germany as England was not yet 
defeated nor was there peace between China and J a p a n , 20 At
19johnson to Secretary of State, Nov, 20, 19hO, U,S, For, 
Rel., 19hO, IV, 436* This information also agrees with the 
s t a t e ^ n t  lay Dr, Schmidt, Hitler** In terpreter, ed. by 
R.H.C. Steed (Hew York; l^wTIGcMTllan Co/; 1951), 243, far 
von Ribbentrop on November 12, 1940, said at the end of a 
discussion with Molotov tha t he would like to  mediate between 
Chiang Kai-shek and Japan.
ZOvon Hassell, 173*
9 8
th* #mm* time. Hitler wae holding off recognition of the 
Wang Ching-wel regime**perhapa to get Japan to attack Singapore. 
The German Foreign Office stated that the German government 
recognized the regime of Chiang Kai*#hek in the same manner 
a# Japan continued to  maintain relation# with the refugee 
government of Holland,21
Even the pfo*Chine»e in Germany under the H itler regime 
were heard* Dr. Schacht informed the Chinese government tha t, 
in order to avoid possible Intervention by the United State# in 
the European war, Germany would be prepared to abandon Japan 
and to  effect rapprochement with China, The Chinese government 
refused and reported the scheme to President Roosevelt, with 
whom Chiang enjoyed close rela tions at th is  time,22
In July 19^1, Germany f in a lly  recognised the Japanese* 
dominated regime of Wang Ching*wel In Nanking, Th*s meant the 
complete break between Chiang KSi^shek and Germany had come. 
*The sacrif ice ,"  wrote von Wel#*#cker, "on our part was 
immense and for i t  we received no thanks from J a p a n . "23 
It was not until January 19^2 that the pro*German 
regime of Chiang Kai-shek gave recognition to  the argument 
that H itler must be defeated f i r s t  and then Japan.
2ljohn#on to Secretary of State, Nov, 20, 19^0, U.S. For. 
Rel., 19hO, IV, 436.
22@rew to  S ecretary  of S ta te , June 13, 1941, U.S. F0&, 
Rel . ,  1941, IV, 975.
23von W elsz lcker ,  256.
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Thu*, th# ff*#Adly relation* between Qerm&ny and Chine, #o 
carefully  bu ilt since 1919, h&d come to an end. Chiang Xml- 
ahekvàM&hl# prd#German sympathie# and the potential* of hi* 
country could have been a more fa ith fu l and aacceeeful a lly  
than Germany*# a l ly  Japan.
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION
The eventual breaking of re la tions between Germany and 
China was only on* of the major mistakes H itler made as th* 
FGhrer of the Third Reich, If he had followed the advice of 
his generals In the la t te r  part of the 1930*s or even in 
the early part of the 19^U*a, World War II might have turned 
out d ifferen tly  for Germany.
The Relchswehr had alway* been In favor of closer 
re la tions between Germany and China, The @erman generals 
looked upon China with it* millions of people as an unlimited 
source of manpower and i t s  tremendous te r r i to ry  as an unlimited 
area for m ilitary operation#, in which many Russianddivislon# 
could be tied  up by the Chinese Nationalist Army. Also, in 
case of war with Russia, China could prove to be an unlimited 
source of raw materials for the German war industry.
Because of the increasing threat of Bolshevism, the 
Relchswehr wanted closer re lations with China and hoped for 
Hitler** cooperation. With th is  Bolshevist threat in mind, 
the Relchswehr became increasingly interested in rebuilding 
the Chinese National Army under the leadership of Marshal 
Chiang Kai#sh*k. In fac t ,  the Relchswehr made great plana
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for China. Large contracts were made with Chiang for 
aabmarine# and airplanes. The newest type of submarines 
were on the drawing boards in Germany and were intended to 
be shipped to  China. The German araament Industry was 
profiting  by developing the new plans which would help to 
keep up with the demands of a modern army.
The in teres t of the Relchswehr was so great that 
F, F. Lia wa* only moderately estimating the sise and extent 
of the Chinese capab ili t ies  if  the Slno*Japanese conflic t 
had been delayed for two more years in saying that China might 
have had 60 Germaa^trained divisions to  throw against the 
Japanese invaders. In the a i r ,  Messerschmitt and Stuka planes 
would have carried Chinese markings and, under the sea, Chinese* 
manned U*boats would have harrassed Japanese shipping in the 
Pacific Ocean*1 Such a force would have been formidable; th is  
build-up of arms could have been one of the reasons that the 
Kwantung Army decided to  s trike  against Chiang before the 
Chinese became too powerful for Japan, The Chinese Nationalist 
Army, with obsolete weapons, was s t i l l  able to  keep a Japanese 
army of more than a million men busldy occupied fighting.
The conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact was misunderstood 
by Japan which was aureadf German backing in case of a conflic t 
with China, And if  H itler had not signed the Anti-Comintern
Ip. F. L iu ; ,102.
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Pact with Japan in 1936, but instead helped China with &ore 
advisers and more war supplies, the Japanese might have 
refrained from attacking and H itler would have had a 
tremendous force on the Russian fron tie r  which might have 
helped the German army In the Russian campaign of 19ht;
H itler could count on the loyalty of Chiang Ka$*shek.
Only H itler and von Ribbentrop were responsible for 
seeking an alliance with Japan. To a great extent, von 
Ribbentrop was influenced by General Oshima, who perhaps 
put the thought of encirclement into the mind of the German 
foreign minister. However, I t  'was H itler who saw Japan as 
the "fortress" against Bolshevism in the Far East, H itler 
claimed that Japan was actually  in the same position In the 
Par East as England in Europe, Japan could more easily  control 
the continent than China, and from th is  geopolitical concept 
the disagreement with the departments such as the Relchswehr, 
the Economics Ministry, and the Foreign Office grew. H itlerf# 
opposition thought that i t  was China which was the strongest 
in Asia. I t must be understood, however, that i t  was not 
the objective which brought about the disagreement, but the 
means of attaining that objective.
Also, the minor o ff ic ia ls  of the German government were 
not the only onesrln opposition to  the Far Eastern policies 
of H itler, but the many Germans who profited from the Sino* 
German trade were also opposed to the idea of a Japanese policy 
above a China policy. It is true that Kurt Bloch estimated
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th#t there were about ^^00 German citizen# In China, bat 
theme German* tn  China were not alone in turning the German 
pre** toward a neutral a t ti tu d e  in the conflic t for they 
received great asaletance from Citizen* inalde Germany,
Many German* realized that a Japaneae*led China would impoae 
many hardship* on the Sino-German trade.
The reason for Chiang** willingness to accept the German 
assistance was that the Chinese Nationalist Army was engaged 
in consolidating the power of Chiang, Chiang Kai*shek was 
Involved in unifying the Chinese Republic under his leadership, 
and he needed foreign Investment and trade to develop China a# 
a modern power. The foreign powers, such as the United State# 
and Great B rita in , fa iled  to give Chiang favorable trade 
agreements while Germany was willing to develop her foreign 
trade a t almost any cost. At f i r s t ,  when H itler came to  
power in Barmany, i t  seemed tha t both he and Chiang had a 
common goal in opposing Bolshlvism. Chiang had already 
waged many campaigns against the communist forces in his 
country; th is  was the actual reason for the Relchswehr 
backing of Chiang. The Relchswehr could look forward to 
a pro*Chinese policy by H itler, When H itler signed the 
Anti*Comintern Pact in 1936, the German general s ta f f  opposed 
I t  vigorously but they lost the struggle in the von Brauchltsch' 
F ritz  case of 1936.
lo i:
The immediate result of the von Falkenhausen mission In 
favor of the Germans was that many of the Chinese German* 
trained officers spoke German and had pro-German sympathies.
The hearts of these Chinese officers were not with the B ritish  
or Americans in World War II, but with the Germans whose 
thoughts and actions they knew so well.
The Japanese saw that the occupation of China by Japan 
was a necessity. The Japanese feared that a Chinese army 
under the program of the Germans might become much too 
powerful. The Kwantung Army must have feared that eventually, 
i f  the build*up of the Chinese army continued, Chiang Kai-shek 
might even think of retaking the Chinese te r r i to r ie s  previously 
taken away from China, or, even worse, tha t the Chinese 
National Army might drive the Japanese army off the Aslan 
continent. Japan#* future was in danger if  she did not occupy 
a i l  of China.
The stalemated war in China was perhaps one of the major 
obstacles which caused the downfall of the Third Reich.
Japan wanted toxaake an end to  the Sino-Japanese c o n f l t t  on 
her terms f i r s t ,  before she attacked Singapore. I t  was not 
un til the summer of 19^0 that the Japanese army and navy saw 
th e ir  chances slipping if they did not attack southeast Asia* 
After Japan had successfully occupied the rich southeast, she 
could proceed with the war against Russia, Japan proved to 
be a stubborn a lly  in 194-1 when H itler wanted her to  attack 
both Singapore and Vladivostok,
10$
Choosing the wrong partner In the  Sino»Japanese c o n f l i c t  
was one of the causes which eventualiy led to t h e  fall of the 
Third  Reich .  I f  H i t l e r  had chosen Ch&ng Kai-shek In s tea d ,  
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The documents of th e  U.S. D epartm ent of S tate, Documents
of IM iats%4o#tio«iai Mint^ for the Far East
th e  m o # tn R $ o r(# $ O r^  'i iïror#% '^ " 'fftr^ '’“p v e 'T h e
facts and information while other documentary wowks such
th e  descriptions and 'd'fs ë ' i w # of''sw 'pe^%ns''as Schacht 
and Joachim von Ribbentrop.
The exciting diaries of Count Qaieasso Ciano and Ulrich 
von Haaseii give the viewpoints of the diplomats and 
stateemen who did not coâpleteiy agree with H itler's 
foreign p o lic ies or those of von Ribbentrop. Pormer 
(Sermxan ambassador to  Tokyo» vw  Dirkeen, merely relates 
his adventures in the German Foreign Ministry while 
Whsst von Weissêcker, former undersecretary of state, 
wrote very apologetic okemoirsi however, as personal 
stories both were important sources of information.
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^3 officers and various c iv ilian  o ff ic ia ls  
30 officers and various c iv ilian  o ff ic ia ls
20 officers and 9 c iv ilian  o ff ic ia ls
LIST OF GERMAN ADVISERS AS OF APRIL*#3@
The advisers are employed by the Chinese government under 
private contract,
SINCE WHAT DURATION OF
RANK NATÆ YEAR IN CHINA CCNTRAl
General of
Infantry re tired von Falkenhausen 1934 ?
Lt* Gen, « Stfecciua 1934 1940
Maj, Gen, M Starke 1933 1939
Col. It Nolte 1931 1939
Col. e Wllck 1932 1940
Lt, Col. R Voigt*Ruschenweyh 1933 1939
I t ,  Col, # Newiger 193$ 1939
Lt. Col. Aderholt 1936 1940
Major # Baumback 1933 Î
Major (V Heinrichs 1934 1939Major « Brandel 1933 1938
Major il Llndemann 1934 1
Capt, M Krammacher 1929 1939
Capt. ts Meyer 1929 1939
Capt. n Baron von Stein 1931 1941
Capt. n Stennes 1933 1939
Capt. H Arnade 1936 1939
Capt. of Mav H von Boddien 1931 1938
*at Lt. a Bauer 1930 1939
1st Lt. n Boegel 1932 1938
2nd Lt. M Hummel 1928 1939
2nd Lt. n Stolzner 1928 1939
2nd Lt. R von Schmeling
Dlringshofen 1934 19392nd Lt. n Borchardt 193$ 1939
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In addition (not under chief adviser):
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M̂ema by Wiehl, April 26̂  1939, D.G.F,P, , D, I, 85<
AppÊ æIx n i
Memorandum by the  Second S e c r e t a r y  of the  U.S. Embaaay In 
France:
September 2, 1938%
Since the  beginning of the Slno*Japaneae War t h e r e  ha* 
been a Chinese M unit ions Purchaser Commission in  B e r l i n .  I 
have seen t h i s  morning a memorandum se n t  by i t  to  the  Chinese 
Embassy here  g iv in g  terms of a German o f f e r  f o r  the  s a l e  of 
a q u a n t i t y  of munit ion* fo r  Immediate d e l iv e r y  to  the  Chinese 
government. This  s t u f f  I s  u r g e n t ly  needed. The memorandum 
i s  dated  September 1, 1938* The m a te r i a l  o f f e r e d  for s a l e  
c o n s i s t s  of :
1 .
s t e r l i n g
2 .
120 7$ 
a p ie c e .
mm. f i e l d  p ie c e s  a t  approx im ate ly  ^^000 pound#
She l l* f o r  above.
3.  60 10^ mm, f i e l d  p ie c e s  (presumably how itzers)
approx im ate ly  ^ ,000  pounds s t e r l i n g  a p ie c e .
a t
h S h e l l s  f o r  above.
100,000 Mauser r i f l e s  and ammunition a t  1^ pounds 
s t e r l i n g  a p i e c e .




and of th e  moat recen t models
u l a t l n g  from th e  above f i g u r e s ,  i t  w i l l  he noted t h a t  
th e  t o t a l  o rder  would amount to  over 11 m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s .  
Terms a re  23 per  cen t  cash and th e  r e s t  c r e d i t ,  f , o . b .  
Rotterdam, The Munitions Purchase Commission i s  p r e s e n t l y  
engaged In t r y in g  t o  make arrangement* t o  g e t  to g e th e r  the 
n ec essa ry  cash ,  approx im ate ly  3 m i l l io n  d o l l a r s .
L(awrence) H ( igg ln s )^
iMemo by H igg ins ,  S ep t .  2, 1933, U.S. Fo r ,  R e l . ,  1938, I I I ,
6o6é
APPENDIX IV
The Foreign Trade Shown by China and Germany 





1939 37.2  6,9%
1 9 #  22,0  2.7%




1939 45.1 4 . 4%,
1940 4.1 0.2%1
Vessels Entered and Cleared by Flags In Chinese ports;
Mo. 1,000 tons
1936 227
1937 413 2,089 (a)
1938 829 2,646 (b) (d)
1939 743 2,127 (c)
1940 422 312 (c) (d)
Note:
(a) Domestic shipping figures for Wuhu, Nanking, Chinkian 
and Soochow not obtainable owing to local h o s t i l i t i e s ,
(b) Domestic shipping figures for Kiukiang now obtainable 
owing to local h o s t i l i t i e s ,
(c) Excluding domestic movements of Chinese Junks,
(d) Domestic figures for Ichang not re ce iv ea .2
%he China Economic Annua 1, 1941, P u b l i s h e r s :  The A s i a t i c
S t a t i s t i e s "  Co*7 To4yo, ' "Japan",'" T o !♦
Zibid., 102.
I l 8
The export of egg* *nd egg products ia 193^*1912
Exported to* 193  ̂ 1932
Great B rita in  $16,946,393 $ l8,480,3l4







Phil. Islands 281,527 331,262
Italy  530,011 232,582
Other countries 709,695 601,965.
The tea trade with Germany was in 1934^4,081 quintals while
in 1935 the trade was 17,827 quintals.^
Quintals in wood o il in*
1934 1935
U.S. of America 410,390 491,999
Hongkong 66,545 87,481
Great B r i t a i n 31,309 36,221
France 31,849 31,124
Germany 22,495 28,923
N ether lands 31,061 20,607
e t h e r  c o u n t r i e s 39^18? 1^, 140
T o ta l
Value $26,216,683 $41,282,8793
In the b r is t le  trade, Germany ranked only th ird  a f te r  the 
U.S. of America and Great Britain^ German trade of 4,726 
quintals in 1934 compared to 6,358 quintals in 1935.
Exports of wolfram ore (tungsten) to ta lled  73,833 quintals 
as compared with 47,065 quintals during 1934. Of the to ta l 
amount Germany took 23,332 quintals, America 10,720 quintals. 
Great B rita in  3,781 quintals, Sweden 6,843 quintals, France , 
and Belgium 2,000 quintals each, and Hongkong 12,6o4 quintal*.^
*The China Yearbook, ed. by H.G.W. Woodhead, C.3.E., 
(Shanghai: The North China Dally News & Herald, Ltd., 1936), 61*
^Ibid, , 62,
5ib id . , 65.
^ I b l d . ,  6 3 .
